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EFFECT OF NEGOTIATOR ACTIVE LISTENING SKILLS ON CRISIS 
(HOSTAGE) NEGOTIATIONS 
by 
Karen N. Guszkowski, M.S. 
Nova Southeastern University 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effectiveness of active listening skills on 
perpetrator response style in crisis negotiations.  The extant literature boasts the utility of 
negotiations in crisis situations for law enforcement that came about in response to 
cataclysmic events such as the Attica Prison Riots (1971), Munich Massacre (1972), and 
the Williamsburg incident (1973). Various crisis negotiation models assert the 
importance of active listening skills in crisis negotiations; given the recent and 
voluminous media attention on police, this research aimed to provide further support for a 
cultural shift in police departments around the country to provide their officers with crisis 
negotiation training.  These trainings allow officers to expand their arsenal of tools that 
decreases their need to rely on a tactical response when verbal de-escalation may be 
warranted to minimize risk to both officer and subject.  The proposed study coded and 
analyzed audio recordings from the first 20 minutes of 12 simulated negotiations.  The 
author proposed: (1) an increase in the proportion of active listening skills within the first 
phase of the negotiation would be associated with a decrease in the proportion of negative 
perpetrator response style in the second phase of the negotiation, (2) an increase in the 
proportion of active listening skills within the first half of the negotiation would be 
associated with an increase in the proportion of positive perpetrator response style in the 
second half of the negotiation, (3) an increase in the proportion of problem-solving 
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utilized during the first phase of the negotiation would be associated with an increase in 
the proportion of negative perpetrator response style in remainder of the negotiation, and 
(4) an increase in the proportion of emotional labeling, paraphrasing and summarizing, 
and open-ended questions utilized during the first half of the negotiation would be 
associated with an increase in the proportion of positive perpetrator response style in the 
second half of the negotiation.  While no significant results were identified via Pearson’s 
correlations, scatterplots were constructed for visual inspection of the data, which 
indicated potential support of hypotheses II and IV when considering the limitations of 
the study. 
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CHAPTER I: Statement of the Problem 
 First responders—particularly law enforcement—are often expected to act as 
front line mental health professionals, without having adequate training on what that 
entails.  Law enforcement officers are often responding to highly emotional emergency 
calls with limited information and the always-present risk of harm.  They are trained to 
assess the risk of the situation on a constant basis and to act swiftly and confidently using 
tools from their training.  However, those tools are typically tactical in nature and may 
not provide law enforcement with the opportunity to practice verbal de-escalation tactics.  
This likely translates to more confidence with tactical means of resolving conflict, which 
presents a greater risk of danger to the perpetrator, bystanders, hostages/victims, and the 
officer themselves.  The use of active listening skills, after training, may offer law 
enforcement officers an additional practiced tool in their arsenal that could reduce risk of 
bodily harm to all involved. 
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CHAPTER II: Review of the Literature 
Evolution of Crisis Negotiations 
“Best way to avoid defeat is to know when and where not to engage, as well as when to 
engage.” - Bolz, (2001) p.61 
Within the academic community, crisis (hostage) negotiations has only recently 
begun to attract attention.  However, the implications of these negotiations have been felt 
by law enforcement and the community-at-large for decades.  Hostage taking incidents 
are not a new phenomenon.  There are even biblical references, such as Genesis 14:12-
16, to use of force as a means to resolve these types of events and references to taking 
hostages as rewards or as a strategy in war.  Throughout history there is evidence of 
hostage-taking incidents that were primarily aimed at ransom for goods, securing barters, 
or as treaties against war.  Such examples include European nations holding captive 
nationals of the newly conquered territories and African nations claiming conquered 
enemies as slaves.  Hostage-taking incidents were also used for coercion of governments 
and nations, with one of the earliest examples that affected the United States being the 
capture of Santo Thomas University in the Philippines by the Japanese in 1945 (Hatcher, 
Mohandie, Turner, & Gelles, 1998).  Not surprisingly, this first wave in the history of 
crisis negotiations was less about negotiating and more about tactical resolutions.  In 
response to hostage-taking incidents becoming more prominent for American law 
enforcement (due to more frequent airplane hijackings and interrupted armed robberies), 
a Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT) was developed by the Los Angeles Police 
Department in 1967 to respond to such incidents with a swift forceful approach (Hatcher 
et al., 1998).    
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While effective, the approach utilized by SWAT in the 1960’s and early 1970’s 
was called into question after two specific events.  These events are credited most with 
being true catalysts for change from the status quo of the time (tactical resolutions).  
These events were the Attica Prison Riot in New York in 1971 and the “Munich 
Massacre” at the 1972 Olympic games (Augustin & Fagan, 2011).  The Attica Prison 
Riot was a four-day standoff with the inmates who had taken over the prison and held 
hostages.  Over 1,200 inmates were able to secure a portion of the facility known as D 
yard and held prison guards as hostages while making various demands to administration 
and State Police.  While most of the inmate demands were regarding the reported 
deteriorating living conditions of the prison, inmates also asked to negotiate amnesty for 
all crimes committed during the riot for the inmates in D yard.  In the morning of day 
four of the standoff, State Police were ordered to deliver an ultimatum to surrender, 
which was refused.  State Police then proceeded to take the facility back by force which 
resulted in the death of 29 inmates and 10 hostages (Wicker, 1994).   
In the 1972 Munich Olympics, a group of Palestinian terrorists entered the 
Olympic athletes’ village and killed two Israeli athletes before capturing nine Israeli 
athletes as hostages.  They demanded the release of 200 Arab prisoners being held in 
Israel, and safe transportation for themselves to Egypt.  Negotiations were attempted, but 
were seen as a stall tactic by the terrorists who continued to threaten harm to the hostages 
if their demands were not met.  Further negotiations lead to the Palestinian terrorists 
taking the hostages to an airstrip where German police had tactical units situated on 
rooftops.  At that point, police demanded the hostages be released and that the terrorists 
surrender.  The demand prompted a Palestinian terrorist to throw a grenade into the 
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helicopter where the Israeli athletes were held which, in turn, prompted German police to 
open fire.  The incident ended with one police officer, 10 of the 12 Palestinian terrorists, 
and all of the Israeli hostages dead (McMains & Mullins, 2015).   
Prior to the Munich Massacre, in 1971, a legal precedent was established in 
Downs v. United States.  This case was litigated after George Cliff had taken his wife 
hostage and hijacked a charter plan with a gun and explosive device in hand.  When the 
plane had to land to refuel, the law enforcement agency that handled the situation decided 
to go tactical by disengaging breaks and engines on the plane when the hostage taker 
refused to come out.  Shortly after the engine was taken out by a sharpshooter, gun shots 
were heard inside the plane.  Upon entering the plane, both the pilot and the hostage were 
dead and the hostage taker had been fatally wounded.  The pilot’s wife filed a civil suit 
against the law enforcement agency handling the situation, claiming negligence that 
resulted in her husband’s death.  The ruling in this case found that the use of force was 
not unreasonable, however, the appeals court found there could have been a better 
alternative considered for the safety of the hostages.  The ruling added negotiations as a 
third possibility to consider in emergency situations as opposed to the traditional 
possibilities of force or escape (McMains & Mullins, 2015).   
In addition, these events were the impetus for the New York City Police 
Department (NYPD) to begin evaluating the usefulness of tactical response to hostage 
situations.  Detective Harvey Schlossberg, who had his Ph.D. in psychology, along with 
Lieutenant Frank Boltz developed principles for negotiators to consider handling hostage 
incidents as crisis management for the hostage taker (McMains & Mullins, 2015).  In 
1973, the NYPD was called to John and Al’s Sporting Goods Store for a robbery in 
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progress.  On arrival, the robbers were trapped in the store with hostages and began firing 
at police.  Two police officers and one robber were injured and one police officer was 
killed in an exchange of gunfire.  The NYPD contained the scene and began negotiations.  
Communication was established and small demands such as food and cigarettes were met 
for the release of hostages.  Even with episodic gun fire from the hostage takers, the 
NYPD held their gunfire and continued negotiations.  Ultimately, the remaining hostages 
were able to escape and the hostage takers conceded.  The success of this approach was 
brought to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by the NYPD and a national training 
program at the FBI Academy in Quantico was established (McMains & Mullins, 2015).   
As a result of these events, the United States initiated a “negotiate first” policy 
(Grubb, 2010) in 1975 when the U.S. Court of Appeals overturned their ruling in Downs 
v. United States to declare that before resorting to the use of force, one must “exhaust all 
reasonable non-violent options” (Birge, 2002, p. 102).  This shifted from negotiation 
being a third option for law enforcement to effectively being the first considered option in 
emergency situations.  Various crisis management teams and trainings began to develop 
around the country for law enforcement under different names such as Crisis Negotiation 
Team (CNT), Crisis Response Team (CRT), Crisis Intervention Team (CIT), and Hostage 
Rescue Team (HRT) all with the intention of ending critical incidents using verbal 
strategies (Augustin & Fagan, 2011).  According to Fagan (2003), “in contrast to tactical 
teams, which regularly create and utilize assault strategies/techniques to end critical 
incidents, negotiation teams create and use verbal strategies to attain the same goals” (p. 
169). 
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The Attica Prison Riot and The Munich Massacre are reminiscent of the first 
generation of crisis intervention where the focus was on terrorism, hijackings, and 
politically motivated international events (Hatcher et al., 1998).  As such, hostages were 
perceived to be primarily utilized for secondary or instrumental gain.  Typologies of 
hostage-takers, developed for the time, mirrored this focus and included the emotionally 
disturbed, the trapped criminal, the prisoner revolt, or the politically motivated (Grubb, 
2010).   
A drastic shift took place in the 1980’s into what is now called the second 
generation of crisis negotiations where the focus turned to barricaded subjects.  Here, the 
language shifted from “hostage” negotiation to “crisis” negotiation (Grubb, 2010) as a 
result of the increase in hostage and barricaded subjects (Botting, Lanceley, & Noesner, 
1995).  At this time, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Crisis Management Unit 
(CMU) also formed the Critical Incident Negotiation Team (CINT) (Botting et al., 1995) 
with the influence of Schlossberg and Boltz emphasizing the management of these 
situations being seen as the hostage taker in crisis.  Schlossberg and Boltz developed 
three principles to help emphasize the importance of the crisis nature of these incidents: 
(a) contain and negotiate with the hostage taker, (b) understand the hostage takers’ 
motivation and personality, and (c) slow the incident down as time is in your favor 
(McMains & Mullins, 2015).  Due to this shift, further training became necessary to 
increase the negotiation teams understanding of what “crisis” situations were, as well as 
identifying specific techniques to implement during these crisis negotiations (Hatcher et 
al., 1998).  In addition to these efforts by NYPD, the first Critical Incident Team (CIT) 
training was developed in Memphis in 1988 which placed mandatory training 
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requirements on the team members who handled these crisis situations (Augustin & 
Fagan, 2011).  
Today, we remain in the second generation of crisis negotiations where the 
psychology of a hostage taker or barricaded subject becomes a key focus, as is the 
psychology and training of the negotiation team.  As stated above, the goal of these 
specialized teams (HRT, CNT, CRT, or CIT) is to resolve critical incidents peacefully 
and without lethal force using a verbal arsenal that includes techniques such as active 
listening, which will be discussed later in more detail. 
“Crisis” v. “Hostage” Negotiations 
 The terms “crisis” and “hostage” negotiations are often used interchangeably in 
the literature.  However, there are fundamental differences between these incidents that 
are important to identify. 
Hostage situations.  Hostages are best defined by their purpose during an 
incident.  The purpose of a hostage, as discussed in the first wave of negotiations, is to 
secure a substantive demand, also known as an instrumental gain.  A substantive demand 
is what the perpetrator wants to achieve through a third party and believes there is no 
other way than taking a hostage to do so.  These incidents can be deliberate and occur 
after careful planning, or they can randomly occur as a frantic measure to ensure the 
perpetrators safety during the commission of a crime (Knutson, 1980).  Examples of 
substantive demands include extreme environmental activists seeking policy change, a 
cultural subgroup bringing attention to a perceived plight, and a bank-robbery gone 
wrong where the robber seeks to escape.  Therefore, a true hostage negotiation requires 
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attention to the substantive demand as the value of the hostage is measured only in how 
far they can manipulate a third party towards meeting their demand.  In a hostage 
negotiation, the perpetrator typically does not have the intent to kill the hostage, although 
they may be prepared to do so (Lanceley, 2003).  Knutson (1980), in an interview with 
airplane hijackers, had one reluctant hijacker explain: 
“What my intention was, was to take ‘em to Vietnam, where they could 
have seen for themselves what was happening to that country and I figured 
that the Vietnamese would have showed them around, you know, different 
hospitals and places bombed and stuff like that…later the passengers will 
return to the United States and they will tell what they’ve seen…that way 
the most publicity could be made against the war.” (p. 122) 
While this depicts how someone could utilize hostages to promote a cause without 
escalating to violence, some hostage takers have violence built into their plan.  In an 
interview with a deliberate hijacker, Knutson (1980), shed light on this difference: 
“Oh, no; it’s not revenge.  That’s a part of the plan.  If I don’t make it, I’m 
gonna kill him.  If I don’t make it, I will kill him…I still have to go back to 
the thing that I have a plan; right?  And a—a part of my plan is killin’ him 
if it messes up.  You—you have to have control.  If I’ve got—if I’ve got six 
hostages and uh-and uh- and one of ‘em is causin’ dissension in the 
group, to sacrifice that one will draw the others into line.” (p. 124) 
Crisis situations.  The simplest and most succinct definition of a crisis is “any 
situation in which a person’s ability to cope is exceeded” (Lanceley, 2003 p. 15).  Crisis 
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situations are highly emotionally charged situations.  Barricaded crisis situations are 
defined as captive taking for the irrational means of harming the captive, such as in 
domestic violence cases.  This is in contrast to a barricaded hostage situation where the 
captive has been taken for some instrumental gain (Booth et al., 2010).  In 1988, it was 
approximated that 52% of all hostage incidents involved a mentally disturbed individual 
(Fuselier, 1988).  In 2004, that estimation remained similar with 50% of hostage 
perpetrators were subjects with mental illness.  This is consistent with more express 
motivations of captive-takers or interpersonal retribution rather than the previously 
identified motives of escape, garnering support for a particular cause, or influence 
change. (Feldman, 2004).  In these captive taking events, it is more likely that the hostage 
is really a “victim in the making” (Lanceley, 2003).  Victim differs from a hostage in that 
the victim is being held for expressive reasons rather than instrumental reasons in a 
hostage situation.  This victim is likely either the “reason” why the perpetrator is in crisis 
or perceived to be contributing to the “reason” the perpetrator is in crisis.  As such, the 
primary goal of these situations is to hurt, humiliate, receive retribution from, or kill the 
victim (Lanceley, 2003).  In contrast, the primary goal of hostage taking incident is 
instrumental gains such as bringing attention to a cause, political change, etc.   
Approximately 90% of captive-taking incidents in the United States are highly 
emotionally charged and involving captives that were actually “victims-to-be” 
(Browning, 2011).  This trend has been identified using the FBI database that tracks 
national hostage and barricaded subject cases (HoBaS).  It is also not uncommon that 
during a crisis situation, the subjects themselves are the potential victim as they barricade 
themselves with the intention of dying by suicide.  While demands may be made during 
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these situations (such as for food, water, or cigarettes), these are not the primary 
motivations for the incident.  Crisis situations are often precipitated by a loss of some 
kind such as a job or relationship.  Gist and Perry (1985) concluded that while negotiators 
were trained in hostage bargaining techniques, they were largely called out for domestic, 
barricaded, or suicidal incidents.  Given the high emotionality of these situations, time is 
the most important factor in negotiation.  Time allows for the development of rapport, for 
fatigue to set in, for intelligence to be gathered, for a rescue plan to be developed, and—
most importantly—time helps decrease emotional reactivity to a situation in order to 
achieve emotional equilibrium (Sen, 1989).  Due to the influence of the second wave of 
negotiations during the 1980’s, the shift towards trying to understand the perpetrators’ 
motives, and exhausting all non-lethal means before going tactical, led to negotiators 
being better prepared to handle the predominately barricaded crisis situations that they 
were encountering.     
Crisis Negotiations Today 
 Today, negotiators are called to intervene in barricaded/suicidal incidents, 
issuance of high-risk warrants and workplace/school violence events (McMains & 
Mullins, 2015).  However, nearly 90% of “callouts” are to non-hostage emotional victims 
(Webster, 2003).  Most departments have a Crisis Response Team (CRT) that is a highly 
specialized group of officers with advanced training in crisis intervention and negotiation 
strategies.  They are called upon when a crisis situation has developed and they must 
intervene.  Typically, it is the first responding officer who initially deals with a crisis 
situation.  Consequently, Crisis Intervention Training (CIT) has become a necessary basic 
part of all law enforcement training.  This training developed in Memphis in 1988 is a 
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collaboration between community mental health resources and law enforcement.  The 
training provides law enforcement with information regarding mental illness and local 
systems of care in an effort to decrease arrests where care can be provided (Teller, 
Munetz, Gil, & Ritter, 2006).  CIT along with intensive advanced curricula and monthly 
trainings (which will be discussed later in more detail) have become the norm for many 
departments across the country for, not only specialized negotiation teams, but all law 
enforcement personnel in an effort to meet the needs of those in crisis.  
Why Crisis Negotiation Training? 
“The nature of a crisis is such that it overrides an individual’s normal psychological and 
biological coping mechanisms.” –(Noesner & Webster, 1997a p.4) 
It is crucial to recognize that although “going tactical” (i.e. immediate SWAT 
team response) was the status quo for some time, this strategy can have dangerous and 
lethal consequences.  From 1990-1993, it was estimated that 240 police officers were 
feloniously killed and an additional 26,000 were injured due to assault by perpetrators 
(Greenstone, 1998).  It is important to consider that a tactical response endangers the 
perpetrator as well as the hostages, bystanders, and most importantly, the law 
enforcement officers that are putting themselves in harm’s way.   Tactical interventions 
do not need to be removed from consideration; however, crisis negotiations can be an 
effective intervention strategy that minimizes such risks.  Indeed, using HoBaS data, Van 
Hasselt et al. (2005a) provided case illustrations in the context of domestic violence 
where only one out of the five required a tactical resolution, due to not being able to 
establish communication.  It is important to note that in all five cases, the subjects had a 
deadly weapon and four had prior histories of domestic violence.  Booth et al., (2010) 
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also used HoBaS data to identify domestic violence captive-taking incidents.  Using 56 
cases, they found that most cases were unplanned and occurred in a private residence.  In 
addition, only 14 of these cases required a tactical entry.  Domestic violence incidents are 
not the only interpersonal retribution style captive-taking events that have been studied.  
Booth, Vecchi, Finney, Van Hasselt, and Romano (2009) also used HoBaS data to 
examine workplace captive-taking incidents.  They identified 15 cases and noted that 
60% of these incidents were planned (unlike the domestic violence incidents), but that 
most cases resolved peacefully with negotiations. 
Negotiator Training 
Gahr (1992) contended that the primary role of a negotiator is to save lives.  To 
do so, a negotiator’s job involves considerable listening, some talking, and small 
interjections that help the hostage taker realize that you are there to resolve the situation 
safely.  In addition, negotiators need to be aware when they arrive on-scene of a critical 
incident that “the subject is already in the midst of considerable internal turmoil” 
(Noesner & Webster, 1997b, p.14).  Therefore, specific training for these situations is 
critical due to the decidedly different nature of the job of a negotiator compared to that of 
the first responding police officer.   
Carlson (1977), attempted to create a standard operating procedure for crisis 
interventions for law enforcement.  This standard operating procedure sought to have 
common questions faced by negotiators answered, prior to engagement in a negotiation, 
to reduce the burden of those decisions being made during negotiations.  Common 
questions included the department’s policy on swapping hostages, providing the subject 
with a weapon or a vehicle, leaving the scene, combining forces with other local law 
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enforcement departments, liaison with utility companies, use of lethal force, how to 
prevent overreaction, and utilization of third party intermediaries (TPI’s).  TPI’s are 
predominately non law enforcement personnel that are utilized during a crisis negotiation 
due to some pre-established relationship with the person in crisis (Lanceley, 2003).  
Another early form of training suggested that negotiators should take objective 
personality tests such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, to promote 
better self-awareness.  Such training encouraged the negotiator to take the time to 
understand their own feelings and biases in order to effectively manage transference, 
countertransference, Stockholm Syndrome, Circadian Rhythm Stress, and various 
personality types (Baruth, 1988). 
Basic Negotiator Training 
 The first formalized curriculum developed by Shea (1988), was referred to as 
tactical communication training and was in response to the notion that “the tough cop of 
today is outdated and ineffective” (Shea, 1988, p. 380).  The 40-hour curriculum 
combined role-play and lecture on various topics, including verbal and non-verbal 
communication, listening skills, proxemics, sexual and cultural differences, calming 
techniques, assessment of attitudes, “sizing up” the situation, and strategies for dealing 
with the emotional person (Shea, 1988).  Fuselier (1986) addressed the early issues 
negotiators faced from their supervisors at the time, the negotiators emphasized the 
following points: our options should be from least to most intrusive, “deadlines are hardly 
kept by bad guys so please don’t give us one”, third party intermediaries are 
untrustworthy, do not exchange hostages, we can still help in tactical mode, and most 
importantly, time is our friend!   
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First responder on-scene training.  One of the most dangerous times of any 
crisis situation is the first 15-45 minutes (Dolan & Fuselier, 1989).  During this interval, 
the first responding officer has the burden of containing, isolating, and controlling the 
scene (Biggs, 1987).  Assembling the crisis response and tactical teams takes time.  
Therefore, it is incumbent on the first responder to initiate contact and evaluate the 
situation.  The goal of the first responder on-scene is to gather as much intelligence as 
possible while assessing for any immediate threats.  First responder on-scene actions, 
which are targeted in training, include: (a) recording all communications with the subject 
in detail, (b) allowing the subject to speak, (c) restraining from giving orders that could 
escalate the situation, (d) minimizing past events leading to the event, (e) avoiding 
making any offers, (f) minimizing emphasis on victims, (g) conveying honest and sincere 
concern, (h) clarifying the situation for the subject, (i) “softening”, but not dismissing 
demands and requests, (j) avoiding deadlines, (k) avoiding problem-solving, (l) not 
allowing outsiders (e.g. family members) to negotiate face-to-face, (m) helping plan the 
surrender if the subject so desires, and (n) assessing suicide risk (Dolan & Fuselier, 1989; 
Mullins, 2003).  Asking about suicidality is warranted as a person will often interpret the 
question concretely.  For example, Lanceley (2003) described how a negotiator asked if a 
subject planned on hurting himself to which the subject replied “no”, yet was found to 
have died by suicide using a gas when a tactical entry was made.  The subject left a note 
stating he had not lied to the negotiator as the gas did not hurt him.  On another case, a 
negotiator asked the subject if she was thinking about suicide, she replied that she was 
not.  However, as time progressed, the negotiator noticed that the subject was slurring her 
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words and indicated she had taken a large quantity of drugs.  The subject informed the 
negotiator she was not thinking about suicide; she was doing it.   
Negotiation team trainings.  The “second wave” of crisis negotiations team 
trainings refined the organizational structure of teams, and increased the utilization of 
role-play scenarios with immediate feedback from team members (Gentz, 1988).  The 
training curriculum emphasized the “oneness” of a negotiation team.  The curriculum 
included basic, intermediate, and advanced training and sought to develop and maintain 
rapport between team members in order to maximize the teams’ efficiency and 
effectiveness.  Illustrative is the FBI’s National Crisis Negotiation Course in Quantico 
composed of 11 modules that involved 80 hours of training with the following modules: 
active listening skills, equipment training, policy and administrative issues training, team 
duties and role training, penal code training applicable to hostage negotiations, 
community resources training, practical exercise, negative stress survival training, case 
illustrations and reviews, and realistic role plays in a variety of settings and different 
types of subjects. In addition, the curriculum calls for communication training and for the 
team to maintain training on a regular basis (Greenstone, 1995a). 
Active listening skills and rapport.  Active listening skills are a critical focus of 
crisis negotiation training.  Use of these skills is the key to establishing rapport and 
determining the “hook”.  The “hook” is the event which led the subject to be in the 
situation he/she is in today that required a CRT callout (DiVasto, 1996).  These skills are 
important in all phases of crisis intervention: de-escalation of emotions, developing 
rapport, gathering information, and problem solving.  Active listening skills include: 
effective pauses, emotional labeling, “I” messages, minimal encouragers, mirroring, 
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paraphrasing, summarizing, and open-ended questions.  Effective pauses are used to 
elongate silences that emphasize an important point or for a negotiator to have time to 
compose themselves.  Emotional labeling is identifying the emotion the subject is 
experiencing and reflecting that emotion back to them.  This involves interpretation of 
how the subject is feeling based on their message content and tone.  “I” messages are to 
be used sparingly but can be employed to express discomfort.  Minimal encouragers 
remind the subject the negotiator is listening.  Mirroring is used to reinforce that you are 
listening by repeating the last few words the subject said.  Paraphrasing is a more active 
form of mirroring where the negotiator puts what the subject says into their own words to 
indicate they are listening but also can be used to verify what was said.  Summarizing is a 
combination of paraphrasing and emotional labeling to combine content and emotion.  
Finally, open-ended questions are questions that cannot be answered with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
but require the subject to actively answer questions and promote further conversation 
(Van Hasselt et al., 2005b; Van Hasselt et al., 2006; Sommers-Flanagan & Sommers-
Flanagan 2012). 
A basic ethical principle of crisis negotiations is to avoid deception and 
demonstrate respect for the subject.  Rapport is critical in a crisis negotiation.  Without 
rapport, there is little likelihood of a successful resolution.  Using deception is a form of 
disrespecting the subject which can be easily detected (Burke, 1995). 
Advanced Negotiator Training  
Advanced negotiation training focuses on the development of personal 
approaches (i.e., a personal style of implementing crisis intervention and negotiation 
strategies), role-playing, physical crisis, specialized procedures, environmental impacts, 
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religion as a factor, and critical incident debriefing (Greenstone, 1994).  When a subject 
resists the negotiation and appears resistant to the process, this can be one of the more 
difficult aspects of negotiating.  William Ury’s 5-step model for “getting past no” 
(Mullins, 2002, p. 64) is an advanced communication technique that can be utilized 
during these incidents.  The first step is not reacting.  Utilizing active pauses and slowing 
down the pace allows a negotiator to minimize their own emotions that can be elicited by 
such a difficult subject.  The second step is to ally with the hostage taker making the two 
of you partners in a collaborative process.  Active listening plays a big role at this point 
and both/and choices are optimally used at this point instead of either/or.  The third step 
is to reframe but not reject demands.  Ignore stonewalling and deadlines by focusing on 
problem-solving as a ‘we’ instead of a ‘they’.  The fourth step is to make it easier for the 
hostage taker to say yes than no by collaborating on alternatives and why they are better 
than the current solution. Tactics such as ‘foot-in-the-door’ can be beneficial here by 
allowing the hostage taker to say yes to small things before asking them to say yes to 
bigger things.  The final step is to reinforce the alternative solution you both came up 
with by not issuing demands and allowing the hostage taker to save face (Mullins, 2002).  
The negotiator is trained to remember that “getting past no” is “bring[ing] the hostage 
taker to his senses, not his knees” (Mullins, 2002, p. 71). 
Key Points in Crisis Negotiations 
 While all these errors may not be specific to crisis negotiations, the ramifications 
of error can include violence and death: 
1. It is important to take the time to understand the intelligence gathered before 
entering into a negotiation, 
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2. Regardless of the day you were having, you must show genuine interest and 
concern for the situation or a meaningful connection with the subject will not be 
possible, 
3. Understand that a negotiation is a dynamic process so keeping in mind the 
strengths and weaknesses of yourself and the subject and be prepared to roll with 
some ups and downs, 
4. Identify the perspective of the subject by understanding their view of the situation 
along with motives and agenda, 
5. Time is your best friend so do not give in to time pressure, 
6. Find the “hook” that led up to this moment, the crisis happened for a reason, so 
find out what that reason is, 
7. Convey that the negotiation is a true collaboration and that walking away from the 
negotiation with the subjects’ needs being met as much as possible is the goal, 
8. If relationship dynamics are at play, make sure you understand what types of 
relationships are between what people and realize that not all relationships need to 
endure, 
9. Remember you have an entire team to support you in the negotiation, do not 
forget about them, and 
10. PRACTICE! (Greenstone, 2007) 
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Crisis Negotiation Models 
 The four stages of a crisis not specific to criminal justice negotiations are 
considered pre-crisis, crisis, negotiation, and resolution (McMains & Mullins, 2015).  
Since these stages are not specified for law enforcement responses to crisis situations, 
various models and approaches—some more comprehensive than others—have attempted 
to better define and explain the dynamic nature of the crisis negotiation process.  One 
such approach is a causal approach which defines a situation by the motives and unique 
characteristics of that situation.  This approach looks at instrumental (meaning for a 
purpose or gain) v. expressive (emotional and irrational) motivations as a guide 
(Schlossberg, 1979).  A second approach emphasized relational limits within a 
negotiation.  The limits were affiliation and interdependence and the way in which the 
negotiator and subject were moving with regard to those limits.   Affiliation is the degree 
to which the two accepted one another; interdependence is the degree to which the two 
impose an obligation on the other.  The interaction of these limits is manifested in the 
dynamic of the negotiation ranging from moving away from each other (low affiliation 
and low interdependence), to moving against each other (low affiliation, high 
interdependence), to moving with the other (high affiliation, low interdependence), and 
moving toward each other (high affiliation, high interdependence).  The latter two are 
more conducive to a peaceful resolution (Donohue & Roberto, 1993).  Business-type 
approaches to crisis negotiations attempt to find mutually beneficial outcomes.  Finally, 
atheoretical approaches rely on a list of rules, rapport building, and active listening 
techniques to influence behavior change that may not be expressed by the subject.  
Similarly, trans-theoretical approaches require the subject to be concerned with their 
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behavior, convinced to change their behavior, plan to change their behavior, and then 
follow-through with that plan (Kelln & McMurtry, 2007). 
Behavioral Change Stairway Model (BCSM).  This model, developed by 
Vecchi, Van Hasselt, and Romano (2005), recognizes the four stages of crisis mentioned 
above: pre-crisis, crisis, negotiation, and resolution where the goal during crisis is 
“restoring the ability of a person to cope through the re-establishment of baseline 
functioning…” (p. 542).  The model utilizes a staircase to symbolize behavior change of 
the subject being something that has to be worked towards by implementing various 
techniques across the duration of the negotiation where each stage is sequential and 
cumulative (Browning, 2011).  The first and most important level of the model is active 
listening, which is continued throughout the negotiation.  From active listening, empathy 
can be achieved.  Empathy is defined as “an identification with, and understanding of, 
another’s situation, feelings, and motives” (Vecchi, Van Hasselt, & Romano, 2005; 
Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972); and from empathy, rapport is established.  Rapport is 
defined as an increased trust and mutual affinity (Vecchi et al., 2005).  At this point, 
negotiators employ face-saving justification or minimizations that set the stage for the 
perpetrator to be allowed to end the crisis.  Once rapport is built, it would be intuitive to 
move to problem solving.  However, the model emphasizes that before moving to the 
influence stage, the negotiator must make certain they have dealt with the emotional state 
and de-escalated the subject, established an open line of communication, and identified a 
precipitating event or “hook”.  Once these have been established, the negotiation 
progresses to the influence stage where the negotiator and subject collaborate in the 
problem-solving process until a resolution is reached and the behavioral change stage is 
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attained (Vecchi et al., 2005).  While the model is not empirically validated, it is taught as 
a real-world approach to demonstrate that over time, the natural progression should be 
toward behavioral change, and that set-backs at any level require a negotiator to rely on 
the skills of the previous levels to “regain footing” (see Appendix A). 
Structural Tactical Engagement Process (STEP).  Developed by Kelln and 
McMurtry (2007), this model is presented as a flexible framework for not only 
understanding, but influencing barricaded subjects.  The model utilizes four stages to 
describe the crisis negotiation process: pre-contemplation, contemplation, preparation, 
and action.  The model is built upon this four-stage crisis negotiation process and has four 
major assumptions that guide negotiations.  Similar to a business-like approach, the first 
assumption is a that peaceful surrender is a common goal for all parties.  The second 
assumption is that subjects can be at different levels of readiness, and the negotiation 
needs to cater to subject’s level of readiness to change.  The third assumption is that the 
negotiator has to collaborate with, not command, the subject in order to move them 
through the levels of readiness.  The fourth assumption is that the subject must progress 
through these stages voluntarily to successfully reach a peaceful surrender (Kelln & 
McMurtry, 2007).  The ultimate benefit of this model derives from understanding that a 
subjects’ willingness to change can dramatically impact the negotiation process.  
Therefore, determining where the subject is in the process can help steer the negotiation 
toward a successful resolution. 
Four-Phase Model (FPM).  This model, developed by Madrigal, Bowman, and 
McClain (2009), attempts to combine and enhance the previous strategies into four 
phases: establishing contact, building rapport, influencing, and surrender (Madrigal, 
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2010).  The model’s phases are expected to occur in order and at particular intervals such 
that identifying the phase of the negotiation will better inform negotiators which tactics to 
employ.  The model utilizes the Communication Rating Scale (CCRS) developed by 
McClain, Callaghan, Madrigal, Unwin, and Castoreno (2006) to identify these phases 
along with the goals and guidelines for negotiators during each phase.  The first phase of 
establishing contact is meant to initiate negotiations with the perpetrator by using 
superficial and safe statements such as impersonal inquiries (i.e., “how’s the weather?”) 
and fill talk (i.e., discussing sports).  The second phase of building rapport is meant to 
build a relationship with the perpetrator utilizing empathy, personal inquiry, and praise 
among other tactics.  Influencing is meant to utilize the personal relationship that was 
developed in the previous stage to make suggestions and reframe the situation by 
minimizing the negative outcomes of surrender.  The final phase provides the perpetrator 
with instructions for the surrender process to ensure their safety (Madrigal, 2010).  While 
this model is meant to address the gaps in the previous models, attempts to validate it 
found support only for the first three phases with a sample of five, incomplete, real-world 
crisis negotiation audiotapes (Madrigal, 2010). 
Although there is no consensus regarding the heuristic value of any of the 
aforementioned models, they are meant to serve a function for negotiators.  That function 
is to act as a guide during negotiations so that a negotiation team can identify the stage of 
the negotiation process they are currently in.  Identification of a particular stage or phase 
is ideally accompanied by use of specific types of verbal negotiation tactics in order to 
move the negotiation towards a peaceful resolution.  Models alone do not ensure a 
peaceful resolution; however, in combination with understanding the characteristics of all 
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participants involved (i.e., negotiator, perpetrator, and hostage/victim), there is an 
increased propensity for such success. 
Negotiator Characteristics 
“Recognition of negotiation as a technique for changing emotional states and 
relationships gave rise to the realization that the mental and emotional condition of the 
hostage taker is not the only factor of concern…”-Bracey (1980) p. 110 
 It was originally believed that any law enforcement officer could be trained to 
become a crisis negotiator.  Given that the first responder on-scene is likely to have to 
initiate the negotiation process, it seemed that any officer could be trained to demonstrate 
they were listening and taking a perpetrator seriously while not attempting to problem 
solve (Mullins, 2003).  However, the typical duties of a road patrol officer are quite 
different than that of a negotiator; the job of the former is to take control of situations and 
quickly problem-solve for a solution so they can get to the next call.  Consequently, 
identification of and screening for, particular personality characteristics and qualities 
believed to be essential for competent crisis negotiators has been the focus of increased 
attention.  For example, Getty and Elam (1988) attempted to utilize objective personality 
measures (e.g. Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and California Personality 
Inventory) to distinguish between negotiators and their law enforcement peers.  They 
found scales that were able to discriminate significantly on both objective measures used 
and concluded from these data that key characteristics for negotiators were: (a) verbal 
fluency, (b) a positive self-image, and (c) increased reasoning ability and sensitivity 
towards others.  This list was expanded by Vakili, Gonzalez, Allen, and Westwell (2002) 
who found the following characteristics of successful crisis negotiators: more socially 
 
 
27 
 
withdrawn, reliable and dependable, increased baseline of arousal and awareness, 
confidence and poise, resourcefulness and efficiency, dutiful sense of morality, more 
reserved, increased ability to control their anger and aggression, increased ability to work 
as part of a team, strong emphasis on cooperation, and disapproval of non-conforming 
behavior.   
Perpetrator Characteristics 
 Research in crisis negotiations has emphasized the determination of 
characteristics of barricaded subjects and captive-takers.  Just prior to the second wave of 
crisis negotiations, it was believed perpetrators fell into one of four categories: a criminal 
who had been caught, a criminal attempting to escape, a person suffering from mental 
illness, or a terrorist (Carlson, 1977).  Welch (1984), on the other hand, expanded the 
number of categories a perpetrator could fall into: crusader, criminal, crazy, suicidal, 
vengeance seeker, disturbed, cornered perpetrator, aggrieved inmate, felonious 
extortionist, social protestor, ideological zealot, terrorist extremist, leader, opportunistic, 
and idealist.  It was believed these groups had vastly different characteristics and 
identifying the type of perpetrator would lead to the appropriate negotiation strategy. 
Deliberate v. reluctant hostage takers.  There has been discussion in the field as 
to whether there was a true distinction between a deliberate or reluctant hostage situation 
(as defined earlier).  Knutson (1980) stated that negotiators should disregard the “grossly 
psychologically impaired captors [due to their] numerical insignificance” (p. 118).  This 
study found a significant difference between reluctant and deliberate hostage takers and 
that the former appeared to be the most prominent of the two.  Bahn (1980) agreed, and 
added that the distinction between a deliberate and reluctant hostage-taker appeared to be 
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the degree to which they were willing to use violence toward hostages.  While reluctant 
hostage-takers appeared to employ hostages as either an afterthought or to convert them 
to followers of their cause (Knutson, 1980), deliberate hostage-takers appeared to use 
hostages as a forethought for tactical advantage (e.g., bargaining power with law 
enforcement) and often initiated a brutal act upon them to make their threat more credible 
to both hostages and authorities (Bahn, 1980). 
 Mentally ill perpetrators.  While Knutson (1980) dismissed the grossly 
psychologically impaired individual in these situations, encountering mentally ill 
barricaded subjects and captive-takers has received increased investigative attention.  For 
example, Fuselier (1981), identified four mentally disturbed hostage-taker types: 
paranoid, depressed, antisocial personality disordered, and inadequate personality 
disordered.  This classification system was an attempt to minimize perpetrator categories 
in order to provide real-world applications for negotiators. This categorization prompted 
research into the specific groupings.   
Paranoid types.  Paranoid types were considered the most difficult due to their 
distrust of law enforcement.  It is recommended to avoid deception and deceptive tactics 
(i.e. lying about having a family member there) more so than with other hostage-taker 
groups and to maintain a straight-forward attitude while remaining calm (Miller, 2007).  
In addition, negotiators are encouraged to accept their statements as true and to not try to 
argue the validity of their statements.  Negotiators are taught to emphasize the 
collaborative nature of problem-solving with paranoid types since any idea brought up by 
the negotiator could be seen as a ploy, (Fuselier, 1981) and to work towards solving 
concrete problems (Miller, 2007).   
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Depressed types.  Depressed types are believed to be at higher risk for suicide; 
therefore, negotiators are encouraged to provide support and recognize that they are 
likely to have slow cognitive processing (Fuselier, 1981).  Consequently, time is essential 
with these individuals as is the need for support from the negotiator.  Negotiators should 
adopt a stance of nurturance through active listening and address suicidality directly (i.e., 
ask about it) (Miller, 2007). 
Antisocial personality types.  Antisocial personality disorder is believed to be 
diagnosable in 40% of all criminals with this group committing approximately 80 to 90% 
of all crimes (Lanceley, 1981).  They are believed to be so self-absorbed that they 
disregard the impact of their behavior on others.  As a result, negotiators should avoid 
utilizing family members (TPI’s) even more than with other personality types and avoid 
discussing interpersonal relationships during negotiations (Lanceley, 1981).  Antisocial 
personality disordered individuals also are less fearful, but seek constant stimulation 
which is often sought through contact with negotiators (Fuselier, 1981).  They are 
believed to be incapable of building genuine rapport, which requires that the negotiator 
appeal to their self-interest by providing face-saving solutions (Miller, 2007). 
Inadequate personality types.  Inadequate personality types are perhaps the most 
frequently encountered of hostage takers due to their poor problem solving abilities, 
pervasive immaturity, and history of being “beaten by life” (Strentz, 1983).  This group 
requires understanding and uncritical acceptance (Fuselier, 1981), and will often start 
with high demands, but be willing to settle for much less.  Negotiators are cautioned that 
while inadequate personality types may be less likely to die by suicide than the depressed 
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types, they are more likely to die by suicide than those with antisocial personality 
disorder. 
Borderline personality types.  Although not initially discussed in the mentally ill 
offender typology, Borum and Strentz (1992) discussed this group as living in a “near 
constant state of crisis” (p.7), and, therefore, are a frequent subject for negotiators.  
Persons with borderline features are characterized by instability in all domains of 
functioning such as self-image, interpersonal relations, mood, and identity.  Due to this 
instability, they may present as the most difficult group with which to negotiate as the 
“real need” is often entangled with their strong need for attention and support.  This can 
be used to the negotiators advantage by building rapport and demonstrating concern 
(Miller, 2007).  In these situations, negotiators are encouraged to provide structure and 
stability while remaining empathic (Borum & Strentz, 1992). 
Psychotic types.  Negotiators faced with a psychotic individual, whether it be 
drug-induced or a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder, need to utilize constructive 
ambivalence (i.e. not admitting to believe or disbelieve in the individual’s delusion) in 
order to not challenge or support the individual’s delusions and remain present focused 
(Miller, 2007). 
Manic types.  Negotiators will sometimes confront a manic individual, whether it 
be drug-induced or a manic episode in someone suffering with Bipolar disorder.  It is 
important for negotiators to maintain a slow, even, and steady tone and to adopt a patient 
position.  While not guaranteed by the nature of manic episodes, it is possible for an 
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individual to “crash” –meaning to come down from their manic episode to a more slowed 
rate of speech—which would require the negotiator to adopt a new stance (Miller, 2007).  
Narcissistic personality types.  These individuals have an inflated sense of self 
that is protecting a frail identity.  Negotiators should imply equal status in order to initiate 
communication with such an individual (Miller, 2007).  Further, they need to balance 
their inflated sense of self with their frail identity. 
Histrionic personality types.  These individuals are often highly dramatic and 
sexualized.  Negotiators should recognize that facts may not be so easy to obtain from 
these individuals as they change their story often to please the negotiator.  This desire to 
be attractive to the negotiator warrants that the latter empathically gratify their need for 
attention while examining resolutions for keeping them safe (Miller, 2007). 
Militias and extremists.  In the late 1990’s, a social trend was made public by 
the bombing of the Federal building in Oklahoma City.  That trend was the militia 
movement where individuals maintained strong Christian and Constitutional beliefs to 
justify their antigovernment actions (Duffy & Brantley, 1997).  These groups are believed 
to be mostly concerned with first, second, and fourteenth amendment rights; it is critical 
for negotiators to initiate and maintain a non-confrontational dialogue in order to better 
asses their threat (Strentz, 1995). 
High-risk negotiation factors.  While it would be ideal to provide negotiators 
with a formula for determining the risk of loss of life during a critical incident, no such 
formula exists.  However, research has ascertained high-risk factors that increase the 
overall risk for loss of life during a negotiation.  Such factors include: a subject who has 
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experienced multiple stressors, a subject’s personal history that encourages male 
dominance, subject’s involvement in previous incidents, lack of family or social support, 
forced confrontation with police, threats or harm to the victim or self, and a verbalized 
suicide intent and plan (Fuselier, Van Zandt, & Lanceley, 1991).  Strentz (1991) 
identified other risk factors, which include: insistence on face-to-face negotiations, 
deadline set for their own death, announcement of a verbal will, history of violence, a 
weapon tied to their body or in the subjects’ hand, insistence on a particular person to 
arrive on-scene, no semblance of rapport being built, hours of negotiation with no clear 
instrumental or expressive demands, and active substance use. 
While the abovementioned characteristics are helpful in identifying risk in a crisis 
situation, they are not the only characteristics that may influence the volatility of the 
situation.  Hostages or victims also have characteristics that may impact the progression 
and resolution of a crisis situation. 
Hostage/Victim Characteristics 
 The most widely researched victim or hostage characteristic is that of Stockholm 
Syndrome (de Fabrique, Van Hasselt, Vecchi, & Romano, 2007).  The concept of 
transference was believed to be the primary basis of the syndrome where the negative 
feelings once directed toward the hostage-taker was transferred to the authorities such 
that they develop positive feelings toward their captors.  In turn, positive feelings are 
transferred back to the hostages from their captors (Fuselier, 1999).  It was once thought 
that this syndrome would be found in all captive-taking incidents.  However, the FBI’s 
Hostage and Barricaded Subject (HoBaS) database, indicates that out of 1,200 cases, 92% 
reported no Stockholm Syndrome in victims.  Two important factors were identified as 
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needing to be present to produce the syndrome: (a) increased time of a negotiation, and 
(b) constant, kind, contact between hostage-taker and victim (Fuselier, 1999).   
 Giebels, Noelanders, and Vervaeke (2005) examined the psychological reactions 
to captivity and found that the most common experience of victims was the feeling of 
hopelessness.  Victims of kidnappings often felt isolated and developed new routines to 
normalize their experiences.  This study emphasized that psychological injury should be a 
consideration for victims and pointed out that role expectations for hostages or victims 
made a difference.  The investigators offered that while the average person may be more 
willing to follow instructions and place self-preservation first, hostages with a law 
enforcement or military background may be less inclined to withstand doing nothing to 
resolve the situation.  This assertion makes collecting intelligence on the hostages of 
equal importance as perpetrator characteristics.  Further, whether there is a single or 
group of hostages/victims may have an impact on the dynamic and outcome of the 
negotiation. 
Crisis Negotiation Team Organization and Roles 
“It’s like a football team where SWAT makes up the offense, negotiators are defense, 
special teams are the medics and you have one head coach with a bunch of 
coordinators” -Detective Brian Plancarté, Broward Sheriff’s Office (2014). 
 The emphasis on a team approach necessitates that a team be established prior to 
crisis negotiation training.  In some departments, the team is compiled by having 
prospective team members submit letters of intent followed by an interview.  Once the 
selection board approves the person, and approval is granted from the higher authorities, 
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that individual is invited to individual and team trainings (Greenstone, 1995a).  Teams 
can be organized with as few as three members: a primary negotiator, a coordinating 
negotiator or coach, and an auxiliary negotiator (Gentz, 1988).  The auxiliary negotiator’s 
role includes keeping incident boards (which are visual aids to consolidate information 
pertaining to the critical incident) current to organize vast information obtained in a 
crisis.  This information would include names and information of the subject, hostages, 
and family members along with deadlines made, police actions conducted or planned, a 
surrender plan, topics to avoid (i.e. “triggers”), and important demands (Duffy, 1997).   
Mullins (2003) found that most teams are composed of 6-10 team members with 
the largest being 20.  Schlossberg (1980) emphasized the necessity of a team approach 
with delegated tasks so that the team can better function as a unit in critical incidents.  
Building an effective negotiation team is essential and relies on eight crucial steps: (a) 
establishing urgency and direction, (b) selecting members for their skill and potential for 
skill development over personality, (c) careful attention to the tone and agenda for the 
first meeting as a team, (d) establishing clear rules for team behavior, (e) pursuing 
immediately productive tasks, (f) challenging the team with new facts and goals, (g) 
spending time together, and (h) utilizing the power of positive feedback, recognition, and 
reward (McMains & Mullins, 2015).  FBI guidelines suggest five specific roles be filled 
in negotiation teams: negotiator supervisor, primary negotiator, secondary negotiator 
(coach), intelligence officer, and mental health consultant (McMains & Mullins, 2015).  
Regini and his colleagues (2002) at the FBI’s Crisis Negotiation Unit offered suggestions 
for selecting crisis team members and leaders. 
 
 
35 
 
 Team members.  Team members should be strong investigators who are able to 
employ a non-confrontational approach.  They should be able to remain calm (or at least 
appear to be calm) during stressful events.  Given the variety of trainings necessary to 
become effective negotiators, time dedication and commitment to the team is essential for 
trainings and actual team call-outs. 
 Team leaders.  Senior investigators or supervisors are best to first consider for 
these positions.  They must: (a) be well trained in current negotiation procedures, (b) 
have the ability to interact with other specialized teams, and (c) be able to assess for risk.  
Equal rank to that of the other specialized team commanders is preferred.  It is 
recommended that crisis response team leaders have a familiarity with psychological 
concepts.  Considerable time dedicated and commitment to trainings and call-outs is 
required. 
 One of the issues negotiators face in a negotiation is pressure from commanders 
to resolve issues quickly.  In a survey addressing issues negotiators wished their 
supervisors knew, negotiators emphasized the importance of time and expressed 
frustration with command setting deadlines for resolutions (since deadlines were rarely 
kept by perpetrators).  In addition, negotiators wanted to be recognized for their ability to 
assist in tactical considerations in order to decrease the lethality to all parties involved 
(Fuselier, 1986).  Working with command can be a particularly difficult issue to 
overcome, especially when command decisions can emanate from multiple specialized 
groups.  Negotiators can facilitate open lines of communication with command by 
emphasizing a “solution-focused” rather than “solution-forced” problem-solving strategy 
(Webster, 2003) and identifying when indicators of progress are evident in the 
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negotiation.  These indicators are: (a) no additional injury to self or others, (b) reduction 
in threats or in intensity of threats, (c) lowered emotions, (d) increased rationality, (e) 
passed deadlines, (f) willingness to bargain, (g) lowering demands, (h) releasing 
hostages, (i) establishing rapport, (j) positive statements towards self or others, and (k) 
questions regarding consequences and surrender (Noesner, 1999).  As training within the 
negotiation team for incidents is essential, so is training and pre-planning lines of 
communication across responders (Walton, 1988).  As contended by Van Zandt (1991), 
“Negotiators do not command; commanders do not negotiate” (p. 18) which underscores 
the dual-role conflict from taking on both responsibilities.  Negotiators need to act as the 
spokesperson to the perpetrator on behalf of the team; the commander needs to see the 
full picture of the crisis situation and its’ ramifications for other specialized teams (Van 
Zandt, 1991). 
Role of the Psychologist in Crisis Negotiation 
 FBI guidelines encourage a mental health consultant be part of the crisis response 
team.  This is because approximately 50-52% of all hostage incidents involve a mentally 
disturbed individual (Feldman, 2004; Fuselier, 1988).  Roles for psychologists on 
negotiation teams were initially considered as: (a) a resource to develop negotiation 
strategies, (b) a consult to train and brief on mental health issues and active listening 
skills, (c) an intelligence gatherer, (d) a post-trauma counselor, or (e) a resource evaluator 
(Powitzky, 1979).  Powitzky (1979) argued that “the majority of practicing psychologists, 
especially those who work outside the criminal justice system, would not be very helpful 
(and some harmful) in a hostage-taking situation” (p.30).  Slatkin (2000) identified 
possible mental health consultant roles being a trainer, coach, observer, monitor, 
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intelligence gatherer, post-incident debriefer, and researcher.  The role of a psychologist 
or mental health professional is believed to be a “circumscribed but critical role” (p. 66).  
Research since has supported the use of mental health consultants and psychologists as 
part of crisis response teams.  Butler, Leitenberg, and Fuselier (1993) examined the 
outcomes based on mental health professional roles and found that agencies utilizing a 
mental health professional, as a consult, reported significantly more surrenders and fewer 
tactical responses.  Hammer, Van Zandt, and Rogan (1994) found that a majority of 
mental health professionals were used either as a post-incident resource, an on-site 
consult, or in trainings for the crisis response team.  Hatcher et al. (1998) discussed the 
practicality of mental health professionals being presented with an opportunity to consult 
with law enforcement.  They emphasize that unlike the major departments like NYPD 
and LAPD (among others), most police departments would not openly offer training and 
consultation experiences to psychologists.  Instead, police departments may ask a 
psychologist to consult on a single-case basis.  This case-by-case based invitation to 
consult may evolve over time into an invitation to consult with the crisis negotiation 
team, if three factors are present: mutual acceptance of the psychologist and the crisis 
negotiation team roles and functions, professional credibility on behalf of the 
psychologist as evidenced by timely distribution of critical information, and the 
psychologists’ ability to function in the field (i.e. on a call-out).  While other accounts of 
roles of psychologists may be speculative, these authors identified four actual roles 
psychologists were utilized for in crisis negotiations (in descending order of frequency): 
(a) consultant/advisor on psychological issues and behavior change (b) integrated team 
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member such that they may have interchangeable roles on the team, (c) primary 
negotiator, and (d) primary controller as an “overall operational commander” (p. 468). 
Coordinating with Other Specialized Teams 
 Crisis response teams are composed of negotiators and Special Weapons and 
Tactics (SWAT) personnel that are jointly commanded by the triad of command.  This 
triad consists of an on-scene incident, tactical, and negotiations commander (McMains & 
Mullins, 2015).  While the incident commander is the ultimate decision maker, he or she 
is advised directly by both the tactical and negotiations commanders to avoid “group-
think” (which is a tendency for members of a group to conform their thinking to other 
members of the group rather than establish independent thought) syndrome (Birge, 2002).  
While the three-part action criteria should be conducted prior to implementing a tactical 
response, SWAT and negotiators often disagree on the answer to each of the three action 
criteria questions.  The three parts of the action criteria are (a)“is action necessary?”, 
(b)“is it risk effective?”, and (c) “is it acceptable”.  SWAT often answers “yes” to all 
three questions with negotiators more often responding “no” (Noesner, 1999).  The order 
of acceptable responses should progress from least to most – from the containment, 
isolation, and attempt to negotiate, to containing and demanding surrender, to utilizing 
chemical agents and snipers, to implementing a tactical breach with SWAT (Fuselier, 
1981).  This is not only an effort to preserve the life of the perpetrator and potential 
victims, but also to preserve safety of the SWAT team.  As mentioned earlier, Greenstone 
(1998) conducted a study from 1990-1993 and found that 240 police officers were 
feloniously killed annually with over 26,000 injured as a result of assault.  SWAT 
officers are at an increased risk for injury or death.  Yet, tactical teams continue to favor 
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physical de-escalation tactics while negotiators emphasize emotional de-escalation 
tactics.  This makes multi-disciplinary team trainings essential to foster positive 
relationships between the teams prior to call-outs (Vecchi et al., 2002).   
Effectiveness of Trained Negotiators  
“[T]here is a modicum of data regarding the utility of specific negotiation approaches 
themselves…[however] investigative efforts to prescriptively apply the most efficacious 
negotiation strategies based on empirically grounded decision-making have yet to be 
conducted.” – Vecchi et al. (2005) p. 549 
 Although there is limited empirical research on crisis negotiations as a whole, the 
extant literature clearly indicates that specialized training of law enforcement officers 
leads to better outcomes of crisis negotiations.  Bristow (1977) examined variables that 
potentially decreased the likelihood of hostages being injured during a five-year period.  
Results showed that that the only factor that diminished the likelihood of harm to the 
hostages was the use of a trained negotiator.  Greenstone (1995b) demonstrated that even 
when the perceived critical component of “a will to live” is missing in a crisis situation, 
trained negotiators were able to instill practical and realistic hope with non-lethal 
resolutions.  Van Hasselt et al. (2005a) looked at five domestic violence case examples to 
ascertain the effectiveness of trained negotiators.  Four of the five cases were negotiated 
with the fifth being non-negotiable due to the negotiators not being able to establish 
communication with the perpetrator. 
Actual negotiations are generally not available to researchers due to various 
political and legal reasons (i.e., liability).  Consequently, researchers have utilized 
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simulated negotiations (similar to role-plays utilized in training curricula) to (a) study 
phenomena specific to crisis negotiations and (b) to determine the efficacy of crisis 
negotiation training (Beune, Giebels, & Sanders, 2009; Beune, Giebels, & Taylor, 2010; 
Beune, Giebels, Adair, Fennis, & Van Der Zee, 2011; Taylor & Donald, 2004; Taylor & 
Donald, 2007).  Beune et al. (2009) examined the influence of disparate verbal tactics and 
utilized a simulation of theft suspects to assess cultural differences of being kind (i.e. 
employing active listening skills and offering rewards) v. rational persuasion (i.e. 
utilizing problem solving) in a suspect’s willingness to give a statement, quality of 
relationship, and admission of guilt.  After 52 simulated police interviews, only active 
listening was positively related to willingness to give a statement and quality of 
relationship regardless of culture.   
Beune, et al. (2011) explored the notion of “strategic sequences”, which are 
defined as “set of behaviors that are aggregated into a sequential manifestation of 
components of influencing behavior” (p. 935), specifically relating them to important 
cultural considerations.  They found that employing rational (i.e. firm statements with 
concessions) compared to relational (i.e. firm yet friendly) messages changed the impact 
of the negotiation when taking into account whether the perpetrator comes from a high 
context culture (where more emphasis is placed on an indirect and context-oriented style 
of communication) or low context culture (where a more direct and content-oriented style 
of communication is used).   
Training validation.  Two empirical studies were found that evaluated the 
validity and efficacy of training programs.  In the first investigation, Van Hassel et al. 
(2005b) examined the validity of a role play procedure used in the FBI’s negotiation 
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training curriculum tool for developing negotiation skills.  The study recruited two 
groups of agents from the FBI: expert negotiators who were trained members of the 
Crisis Negotiation Team and non-expert agents with no formal crisis negotiation training.  
Active listening skill use was measured to determine if the use of active listening skills 
could discriminate the expert negotiators from the non-expert agents during role play 
scenarios.  Results showed that expert negotiators had significantly higher use of active 
listening skills overall, and specifically differed from their non-expert agent peers by 
their increased use of paraphrasing, emotional labeling, and reflection/mirroring.  This 
study demonstrated not only the validity of the role play test as an assessment tool for 
training crisis negotiators but as a measure to discriminate trained negotiators from 
untrained law enforcement peers.  A second study by Van Hasselt et al. (2006) explored 
the effectiveness of the FBI’s National Crisis Negotiation Course (NCNC) which is used 
to train crisis negotiators across the country.  The study incorporated the role play test 
validated by Van Hasselt et al., (2005b) to determine pre-post training differences on 
levels of active listening skills demonstrated in role play scenarios.  Results indicated that 
after the course, there was a significant increase in three of four active listening skills 
measured (paraphrasing, emotional labeling, reflection/mirroring) and a significant 
decrease in problem-solving from pre- to post-test.   
 While these studies do not definitively conclude that trained negotiators will 
always find a peaceful resolution to a crisis situation, they do provide evidence for the 
value of a trained negotiator, and active listening skills as a whole, in crisis negotiations.  
Since active listening skills are often taught at the basic, intermediate, and advanced level 
of negotiator trainings, it is important to further add to the literature by exploring the 
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effects of specific active listening skills on perpetrator response style within a 
negotiation.   
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to explore the effects of specific active listening 
skills within a crisis negotiation by analyzing both negotiator use of active listening skills 
and perpetrator response style.  The considered impact of this research was to offer 
support for a cultural shift in police departments nationwide to provide their officers with 
basic crisis negotiation training.  Such trainings allow officers to expand their arsenal of 
tools in a way that decreases their need to rely on a tactical response when a verbal de-
escalation may be warranted and sufficient.  Further trainings are expected to minimize 
the risk of harm to both officer and subject. 
Research Hypotheses 
1. An increase in the proportion of active listening skills in Phase One of the 
negotiation will be associated with a decrease proportion of negative perpetrator 
response style in Phase Two of the negotiation, relative to positive perpetrator 
response style. 
2. An increase in the proportion of active listening skills in Phases One and Two of 
the negotiation will be associated with an increase proportion of positive 
perpetrator response style in Phases Three and Four of the negotiation, relative to 
negative perpetrator response style. 
3. An increase in the proportion of problem-solving utilized during Phase One of the 
negotiation will be associated with an increase proportion of negative perpetrator 
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response style in Phases Two, Three, and Four of the negotiation, relative to 
positive perpetrator response style. 
4. An increase in the proportion of Emotional Labeling, Paraphrasing and 
Summarizing, and Open-Ended Questions utilized during Phases One and Two of 
the negotiation will be associated with an increase proportion of positive 
perpetrator response style in Phases Three and Four of the negotiation, relative to 
negative perpetrator response style. 
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CHAPTER III: Methodology 
Design 
The study employed a passive observational design.  It utilized simulated 
negotiations, as is consistent with the literature (Beune et al., 2009; Beune et al., 2010; 
Beune et al., 2011; Taylor & Donald, 2004; Taylor & Donald, 2007; Van Hasselt & 
Romano, 2004), conducted in the context of monthly Crisis Response Team (CRT) 
trainings with local police departments in South Florida.  The study aimed to explore the 
effects of active listening skills taught in the FBI’s National Crisis Negotiation Course 
(Van Hasselt et al., 2006) on perpetrator response style—accumulation of specific 
behaviors that have been grouped into positive, negative, and neutral response style 
groups—within the context of crisis negotiations. 
Participants 
Twelve simulated crisis negotiations (e.g., barricaded suicidal subject) were 
collected and analyzed for the purpose of this study.  Within each simulated crisis 
negotiation (i.e., “case”), the negotiator (participant) attempted to employ various active 
listening techniques (described below) to establish empathy, rapport, and ultimately 
achieve a non-lethal resolution with the perpetrator (enacted by the confederate).  
Negotiators from participating local police departments’ CRTs served as the negotiator in 
the simulated negotiations.  A single negotiator (participant) participated in a single 
negotiation.  The following demographics were collected on the participants: age (mean = 
38.7 years; ranging 26-60 years old), gender (75% were male), years as a law 
enforcement officer (mean = 14.4 years; ranging 2.5-38 years), and years on the 
department’s CRT (mean 3.5 years; ranging 6 months-9 years). All participating CRT 
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negotiators consented to involvement prior to entering the study (see Appendix B).  In 
addition to recruitment for this study, Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was 
obtained. 
Measures 
Demographic data for all participants were collected using a six-item 
Demographic Questionnaire that asked for name/initials, age, gender, police department, 
years of experience as a police officer, and years of experience on CRT.  Demographic 
data for all confederates were collected using a five-item questionnaire that asked for age, 
race, gender, years of clinical training in a doctoral program, and duration role playing 
with the Nova Players (described below).  All simulated negotiations were recorded via a 
hand-held recording device through either a Throw-Phone—a communication device that 
is “thrown” into the location where a subject is barricaded to allow for communication 
when the subject is not available by land-line—or a mobile phone, that was held by the 
perpetrator during the negotiation.   
In this investigation, only the first 20 minutes of each recorded simulated 
negotiation was coded using a behavioral coding system (DataPal 1.0).  The 20-minute 
recording was then manually divided into four Phases for analysis of the key variables.  
Phase One was from 0-5 minutes, Phase Two was from 5:01-10 minutes, Phase Three 
was from 10:01-15 minutes, and Phase Four was from 15:01-20 minutes.  During some 
negotiations, the confederate would hang-up on the negotiator and the negotiator would 
take a minute or two before calling again.  In these instances, raters were trained to 
“pause out” of the coding when the confederate would hang-up and “pause back in” when 
the negotiator would call again.  This was done to ensure the 20 minutes of coded data 
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contained actual negotiation time.   Key variables were divided into three categories: (a) 
negotiator active listening variables (6 variables), (b) other negotiator tactics (4 
variables), and (c) perpetrator response style variables (3 variables). 
The inter-rater agreement was calculated for each simulated negotiation and 
showed a minimum of 70% agreement between every variable within the negotiation 
(Mudford, Zeleny, Fisher, Klum, & Owen, 2011).  Table 3.1 below lists the inter-rater 
agreement for each variable across the simulated negotiations (cases 1-12).  Inter-rater 
agreement was calculated using a program called DataPalReli 1.0 that is a program which 
computes exact inter-rater agreement percentages between coded cases through DataPal. 
Active listening skills.  Active listening includes essential communication skills 
taught to negotiators nationwide at the FBI’s National Crisis Negotiation Course in an 
effort to increase their ability to verbally de-escalate a crisis situation.  The definitions 
listed below have been adapted from Sommers-Flanagan and Sommers-Flanagan (2012) 
and Van Hasselt et al. (2006). 
Paraphrasing and Summarizing are a rephrase of content stated by the 
perpetrator.  Paraphrasing is rephrasing a single sentence or topic, while a summary is 
rephrasing several topics covered.  For example, “So it sounds like a lot is going on with 
your mother recently passing away, your girlfriend leaving you, and your boss getting on 
your case at your job.” 
Mirroring is a non-directive reflection and is simply a restatement of the 
perpetrator’s own words.  For example, the perpetrator states, “I’m just so sick and tired” 
and the negotiator responds “sick and tired.” 
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Emotional Labeling is an interpretive reflection of feeling, and is a statement 
made by the negotiator that indicates the feeling(s) the negotiator believes are underlying 
the perpetrator’s thoughts or actions.  For example, “You seem distraught!” 
 “I” messages can either be a non-threatening way to communicate how the 
perpetrator is making the negotiator feel, or a way to refocus the perpetrator when they 
are verbally attacking the negotiator.  For example, “I’m worried that you feel I’m only 
here to do a job.” 
Open-Ended Questions are queries that require more than a single-word 
response, and directly elicit information from the perpetrator.  For example, “Tell me 
more about that…” 
Minimal Encouragers are sounds made by the negotiator to let the perpetrator 
know that he/she is still there and listening, while not interfering with the flow of 
conversation.  For example, “uh-huh.” 
Negotiator Tactics. Adapted from Sommers-Flanagan and Sommers-Flanagan 
(2012), Vecchi et al. (2005) and Van Hasselt et al., (2006), these are specific tactics 
employed by negotiators in order to influence perpetrator behavior change.  In addition, 
other common negotiator responses that were coded, but are not considered active 
listening skills, are defined below.  
Face-Saving Justification and Minimization are precursors to the ending of a 
crisis and consist of rationalizations, justification, and mitigations of a perpetrators 
actions. For example, “You didn’t kill anybody yet; You haven’t done anything wrong.” 
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Normalizing is a feeling validation and is a statement made by the negotiator that 
supports, affirms, approves of, or validates feelings articulated by the perpetrator.  For 
example, “It seems completely normal that you feel that way!” 
Problem-Solving is also known as “advice” and is a recommendation given to the 
perpetrator by the negotiator.  It can include recommendations on how to act, think, or 
feel.  For example, “Why don’t we try putting the gun down?” 
Closed-ended questions.  Queries that can be answered with a single-word 
response, and directly elicit information from the perpetrator.  For example, “Do you 
want to talk to me?” 
 
Perpetrator response style variables.  (Adapted from McClain, Callaghan, 
Madrigal, Unwin, and Castoreno’s [2006] Crisis Communication Rating Scale.)  To 
simplify the behavioral coding system established with this rating scale, codes that had a 
subjectively positive connotation were adapted to be positive responses.  Likewise, codes 
that had a subjectively negative connotation were adapted to be negative responses.  Any 
perpetrator response code that did not meet either positive or negative response style 
were considered to be a default code of neutral response. 
 Positive response is a word, statement, or other audible cue from the perpetrator 
that indicates the negotiator has aligned with, built rapport with, or otherwise prosocially 
influenced the perpetrator.  For example, “You’re right.” 
 Negative response is a word, statement, or other audible cue from the perpetrator 
that indicates the negotiator has not aligned with, built rapport with, or otherwise pro-
socially influenced the perpetrator.  For example, “Screw you; I’m going to kill everyone 
in here.” 
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 Neutral response is a response by the perpetrator that does not meet the definition 
for either positive or negative response.  For example, “I guess, but…”. 
Procedures 
 The procedures were divided into three parts: (1) confederate training and 
procedures, (2) coder procedures for training, and (3) study procedures integrating 
experimenter, coder, and participant roles. 
Confederate training and procedures.  Confederates who served as role players 
(perpetrators) were members of the Nova Players.  Nova Players were doctoral students 
in Clinical Psychology at Nova Southeastern University involved with the Police 
Psychology Research Program and were trained in scenario-based role plays of 
hostage/barricaded subject situations.  Four doctoral students were trained in this 
investigations’ scenario-based role play of a suicidal barricaded subject (see Appendix 
C).  Each of the four confederates conducted three simulated negotiation scenarios with 
three different negotiators (participants) using a random block design.  Training for 
confederates was accomplished by the following steps: (a) the prospective confederates 
conducted the role-play in front of an expert in crisis-negotiations for evaluation, (b) the 
expert rated each prospective confederate based on the extent to which their enactment 
was realistic (1=highly unrealistic; 7=highly realistic) with higher ratings ( ≥  6 on the 7-
point scale; adapted from Vagias, 2006) considered acceptable for participation in the 
study, and (c) the Primary Investigator (PI) practiced the scenario with those confederates 
who received acceptable ratings prior to data collection.  Demographic data were 
collected on the confederates after reaching an acceptable score in their enactment with 
the expert and prior to beginning simulated negotiations.   
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Coding procedures.  Three graduate students at Nova Southeastern University 
were trained to code the recordings.  Training was carried out as follows: (a) the PI 
obtained a recording for training purposes only, (b) each rater was trained on the 
Behavioral Coding System (see Appendix D) by the PI, (c) each rater coded the training 
scenario, (d) the agreement in coding between the raters was calculated. Raters were 
considered ready to code the simulated negotiations from the actual student when inter-
rater agreement reached a minimum of 80% among all variables, where a kappa statistic 
range between .61 and .80 is considered substantial and .81-1.00 is considered almost 
perfect (Landis & Koch, 1977).  Raters who did not meet the 80% agreement threshold 
on the training scenario were retrained until 80% agreement was achieved. The simulated 
negotiation recordings were then coded by using the behavioral coding system.  For study 
data, inter-rater agreement was calculated by having a different trained rater 
independently code all of the cases with a minimum of 70% accuracy between the two 
raters.  Inter-rater agreement was monitored throughout the data collection portion of this 
study to ensure minimization of rater-drift.  In the event a case was coded with less than 
70% agreement between the two raters, the two raters met and collaborated with the PI to 
reach a consensus regarding confusion in operational definitions before re-coding the 
case.  While all cases were capped at 20 minutes, some were paused at various points 
during data coding to account for time when neither participant nor confederate were 
speaking (e.g., time between the confederate hanging up the phone and the participant 
calling back).  As a result, Phase times varied in these cases to correspond to the 
appropriate amount of “paused time”. 
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Study procedures.  Prior to the start of the role play portion of the monthly 
multi-agency CRT, CRT members who were negotiating in training were asked if they 
would agree to participate in the study.  Informed consent, approved by IRB, was 
reviewed with the participant by the PI.  The police negotiator and confederate were in 
separate areas of the training facility and were not visible to one another or within earshot 
of one another.  The confederate re-familiarized him/herself with the scenario (see 
Appendix E), before meeting with the officer whose role was to collect initial intelligence 
concerning the scenario. The confederate was instructed to provide only the information 
listed as Intelligence for Law Enforcement (Appendix F) to the officer.  After receiving 
this information and conferring with his/her team, the negotiator initiated contact via 
throw-phone (or mobile phone), at which time data collection was initiated.  The 
negotiator was aware that in order for the study to generalize to real-world scenarios, the 
negotiator must treat the role play as a real-life situation and was to rely on their own 
training and the help of their coaches in the negotiation.  The confederate answered the 
phone call, in character, and began disclosing information as deemed fit given the 
scenario and the rapport with the negotiator.   
The confederate was encouraged to treat the role-play as a real-life situation and 
remain in character, letting the negotiation happen as authentically as possible. The 
confederate was encouraged to behave in a way that was consistent with real-world 
scenarios, such as questioning, laughing with, cursing at, hanging-up on, or threatening 
the negotiator, when appropriate in the role play.  In addition, the confederates were 
provided the Key Phrases (see Appendix G) outlined in the scenario to help them more 
accurately portray the scenario.  The confederate was to use the scenario as the guideline 
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for their role play and to not disclose their Hook (i.e., pertinent information to the reason 
for the crisis; see Appendix H) until they felt the negotiator had established sufficient 
rapport to warrant that information.  Confederates were encouraged to provide a strong 
negative response to Triggers (i.e., topics that exacerbate the crisis; see Appendix I) 
outlined in the scenario.  A confederate chose to end the negotiation either as a lethal or 
non-lethal (surrender) resolution depending on the natural progression of the negotiation.  
An important consideration for this study was that while it may be natural for a negotiator 
to switch-out with another negotiator if warranted during a scenario (e.g., due to a 
perpetrator becoming more volatile when speaking to someone of a certain gender), 
negotiators who participated in this study were asked to remain on the phone for the 
duration of the negotiation.   
Once the simulated negotiation had concluded, the confederate turned off the 
recording device (if they are using a hand-held device) and the PI then met with the 
negotiator to administer the 6-item questionnaire (see Appendix J) to the negotiator 
before beginning another negotiation.  To maintain fidelity of this study, feedback was 
not provided to the negotiator or the team so that the scenario would not be compromised 
for future participants.  All recordings were saved on a password-protected external hard-
drive. 
Data Analyses 
The data analytic strategy to address H1 employed a Pearson correlation to 
evaluate the linear association between the proportion of active listening skills in Phase 
Onei with the proportion of negative perpetrator responses in Phase Twoii.  To address 
H2, a Pearson correlation was employed to evaluate the linear association between the 
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proportion of active listening skills in the first half of the negotiation (Phases One and 
Two)iii with the proportion of positive perpetrator responses in the second half of the 
negotiation (Phases Three and Four)iv.  The data analysis strategy to address H3 
employed a Pearson correlation to evaluate the proportion of problem-solving in Phase 
Onev with the proportion of negative perpetrator responses during the remainder of the 
negotiation (Phases Two, Three, and Four)vi.  To address H4, four Pearson correlations 
were calculated to evaluate associations between the following pairs of variables:  (a) the 
proportion emotional labeling, paraphrasing/summarizing, and open-ended questions in 
the first half of the negotiation (Phases One and Two)vii with the proportion of positive 
perpetrator responses during the second half of the negotiation (Phases Three and 
Four)viii, (b) the proportion of emotional labeling in the first half of the negotiationix with 
the proportion of positive perpetrator responses in the second half of the negotiation, (c) 
the proportion of paraphrasing/summarizing in the first half of the negotiationx with the 
proportion of positive perpetrator responses in the second half of the negotiation, and (d) 
the proportion of open-ended questions in the first half of the negotiationxi with the 
proportion of positive perpetrator responses in the second half of the negotiation. 
In addition, scatterplots were constructed for visual examination of all 
correlations described above and inter-rater agreement percentage was calculated for all 
simulated negotiations (Table 3.1)xii.   All analyses were performed using IBM SPSS 
Statistics 24 (IBM Corp. Released 2016. IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 
24.0. Armonk, NY: IBM Corp).  Type I error was set at α=.05 for all analyses.   
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Table 3.1 
DataPalReli 1.0 Interrater Agreement Percentage 
                              
    Coded Variables 
    p m e n i o c v u j 0   1   2 
Simulated  Negotiation  
1 99.17 97.50 100 100 99.17 95.83 94.17 95.00 95.00 96.67 88.33 91.67 92.50 
2 99.17 95.00 100 99.17 99.17 96.67 90.00 94.17 95.00 98.33 89.17 92.50 95.83 
3 95.42 96.95 99.24 96.18 98.47 95.42 88.55 93.13 88.55 96.95 83.21 90.08 95.42 
4 94.17 95.83 97.50 99.17 97.50 95.83 89.17 90.83 95.83 91.67 80.00 92.50 80.00 
5 95.83 99.17 99.17 99.17 99.17 96.67 91.67 93.33 95.83 97.50 87.50 84.17 84.17 
6 99.10 99.10 100 100 100 94.59 90.99 88.29 86.49 97.30 89.19 82.88 81.98 
7 96.67 99.17 98.33 100 100 90.83 81.67 94.17 85.83 95.00 86.67 87.50 89.17 
8 96.67 100 98.33 99.17 99.17 87.50 80.00 95.00 92.50 93.33 80.00 71.67 73.33 
9 92.50 99.17 97.50 100 100 95.00 90.83 94.17 89.17 95.83 82.50 93.33 70.83 
10 96.69 99.17 96.69 99.17 99.17 98.35 89.26 88.43 98.35 95.87 86.78 83.47 79.34 
11 99.18 100 100 98.36 100 94.26 91.80 90.16 99.18 97.54 89.34 88.52 81.15 
12 99.17 100 100 98.33 100 98.33 95.83 95.83 98.33 95.00 89.17 89.17 83.33 
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CHAPTER IV: Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The following demographic characteristics were obtained for the confederates: 
age (mean= 26.3 years; SD= 3.94; ranging 23-31 years old), gender (75% female), years 
in doctoral program (mean= 2.5; SD= 1.00; ranging 2-4 years), and years as a Nova 
Player (mean=2; SD=0.41; ranging 1.5-2.5 years).  The following demographic 
characteristics were obtained for the participants: age (mean= 38.7 years; SD= 11.31; 
ranging 26-60 years old), gender (75% male), years as a law enforcement officer (mean= 
14.4; SD= 10.65; ranging 2.5-38 years), and years on the Crisis Response/Hostage 
Rescue team as a negotiator (mean= 3.5; SD= 2.76; ranging 0.5-9 years).  It is worth 
noting that there was a single participant that did not wish to provide demographic 
information. 
Study Results 
It was hypothesized that an increase in the proportion of active listening skills in 
Phase One of the negotiation would be associated with a decrease in the proportion of 
negative perpetrator responses in the subsequent phase (H1).  A non-significant Pearson 
correlation was found that did not trend in the hypothesized direction (r =.255, p= .424) 
(Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1).  
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Table 3.2 
H1: Comparing Active Listening Skills in Phase One with Negative Responses in Phase 
Two 
          
 
 
 
 
Proportion of Active 
Listening Skills in 
Phase One 
  
Proportion of Negative 
Perpetrator Responses in 
Phase Two 
  
Pearson Correlation 0.255 
Sig (2-tail) 0.424 
N 12   
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It was hypothesized that an increase in the proportion of active listening skills in 
the first half of the negotiation (Phases One and Two) would be associated with an 
increase in the proportion of positive perpetrator responses in the second half of the 
negotiation (Phases Three and Four; H2).  A non-significant Pearson correlation was 
found (r =.124, p = .701) that trended in the hypothesized direction upon visual 
inspection of the data (Table 3.3 and Figure 3.2).  
Table 3.3 
H2: Comparing Active Listening Skills in the First Half with Positive Responses in the 
Second Half 
          
 
 
 
Proportion of Active 
Listening Skills in First 
Half 
  
Proportion of Positive 
Perpetrator Responses in 
Second Half 
  
Pearson Correlation 0.124 
Sig (2-tail) 0.701 
N 12   
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It was hypothesized that an increase in the proportion of problem-solving during 
Phase One of the negotiation would be associated with an increase in the proportion of 
negative perpetrator responses in the remaining phases (H3).  A non-significant Pearson 
correlation was found (r = .128, p= .692) that appeared random upon visual inspection of 
the data, which does not trend in the hypothesized direction (Table 3.4 and Figure 3.3).  
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Table 3.4 
H3: Comparing Problem Solving in Phase One with Negative Responses in the 
Remainder of the Negotiation 
          
Proportion of Problem 
Solving in Phase One   
Proportion of Positive 
Perpetrator Responses in 
Remainder of 
Negotiation 
  
Pearson Correlation 0.128 
Sig (2-tail) 0.692 
N 12   
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Lastly, it was hypothesized that an increase in the proportion of specific active 
listening skills—emotional labeling, paraphrasing/summarizing, and open-ended 
questions—during the first half of the negotiation (Phases One and Two) would be 
associated with an increase in the proportion of positive responses in the second half of 
the negotiation (Phases Three and Four combined; H4a).  A non-significant Pearson 
correlation was found (r = .117, p = .717) that trended in the hypothesized direction upon 
visual inspection of the data (Table 3.5 and Figure 3.4).   Assessing each specific active 
listening skill separately, non-significant Pearson correlations were found with the 
following results of visual inspection: (a) emotional labeling (r = -.477, p = .145; H4b) 
not trending in the hypothesized direction (Table 3.5 and Figure 3.5), (b) 
paraphrasing/summarizing (r = .189, p = .557; H4c) trending in the hypothesized 
direction (Table 3.5 and Figure 3.6), and (c) open-ended questions (r = .250; p = .433; 
H4d) trending in the hypothesized direction (Table 3.5 and Figure 3.7).  
Table 3.5 
H4: Comparing Emotional Labeling, Paraphrasing/Summarizing, and Open-Ended 
Questions (EPO) in First Half with Positive Responses in Second Half 
          
 
 
 
Proportion of EPO in 
First Half              
(H4a) 
  
Proportion of Positive 
Perpetrator Responses in 
Second Half 
  
Pearson Correlation 0.117 
Sig (2-tail) 0.717 
N 12   
 
 
 
Proportion of   
Proportion of Positive 
Perpetrator Responses in 
Second Half 
  
Pearson Correlation -0.477 
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Emotional Labeling in 
First Half (H4b) Sig (2-tail) 0.145 N 12   
 
 
Proportion of 
Paraphrasing/ 
Summarizing in First 
Half (H4c) 
  
Proportion of Positive 
Perpetrator Responses in 
Second Half 
  
Pearson Correlation 0.189 
Sig (2-tail) 0.557 
N 12   
 
 
 
Proportion of Open-
Ended Questions in 
First Half              
(H4d) 
  
Proportion of Positive 
Perpetrator Responses in 
Second Half 
  
Pearson Correlation 0.25 
Sig (2-tail) 0.433 
N 12   
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
63 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
CHAPTER V: Discussion 
Reviewing the Hypotheses and Limitations 
 The purpose of this pilot study was to build upon the limited literature regarding 
the benefit of utilizing active listening skills within crisis negotiations (Beune et al., 
2009; Beune et al., 2010; Van Hasselt et al., 2005b; Van Hasselt et al., 2006; and Vecchi 
et al., 2005).  This pilot study aimed to examine a temporal impact of active listening 
skills on a perpetrators response style by creating artificial phases within simulated 
negotiations.  Role-play scenarios are considered an effective format for the “extensive 
behavior rehearsal necessary for new negotiators to gain proficiency in [active listening]” 
(Van Hasselt & Romano, 2004; p. 16).  While this pilot study found no statistically 
significant support for any of the hypotheses, this study did provide “proof of concept”—
that we can examine the process of crisis negotiations through behavioral coding of 
active listening skills and perpetrator response styles—and can be analyzed for its 
limitations to provide more guidance towards improved future versions of this study.  
Behavioral coding of negotiations is not a new concept, but is typically described in the 
existing literature as “speaking turns” (Beune et al., 2010; p. 911) and is analyzed using a 
proximity coefficient to demonstrate the interconnectedness of behaviors (Giebels & 
Taylor, 2009).  This study attempted to expand upon the coding of “speaking turns” by 
focusing on specific behaviors (i.e., active listening and perpetrator response styles) and 
analyzing them within a temporal framework.  It is believed that the insignificant findings 
may be in large part due to the immensely small sample size, especially when taking into 
account then number of variables and covariates that were explored.  However, it is still 
important to discuss the trends that were observed within this small sample size as a 
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stepping stone towards a more robust study of the effectiveness of active listening skills 
within the context of crisis negotiations. 
 The first hypothesis posited that an increase in active listening skills during the 
first phase of a negotiation would correlate with a decrease in negative perpetrator 
responding in the second phase.  This hypothesis developed from the Behavioral Change 
Stairway Model theory that active listening skills help break down a person’s defensive 
posture, which in turn, would allow them to build rapport with and respond more 
positively to the negotiator (Vecchi et al., 2005).  The theory is further supported by 
Beune et al. (2009) who demonstrated only active listening skills, compared to other 
influencing tactics utilized by law enforcement, were positively related to behavior 
change.  This hypothesis was not only unsupported by a significant correlation, but visual 
observation of the data showed, an albeit non-significant, opposite effect.  Some 
limitations of the study may have contributed to this unexpected result.  One limitation 
may have been the operational definition of negative perpetrator response style.  It is 
possible that the definition itself may be coding objectively negative vocalization that are 
actually beneficial within the context of the negotiation because the perpetrator is able to 
express themselves, which may be cathartic.  Another such limitation is the small number 
of observations of active listening skills across each phase (and across each negotiation).  
In addition, the phases themselves are potentially a limitation in this study because they 
were arbitrarily assigned 5 minute intervals.   
 The second hypothesis proposed an increase in positive perpetrator responses in 
the second half of the negotiation as active listening skills increased in the first half.  This 
hypothesis attempted to ascertain the impact of artificially created phases by expanding 
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upon the first hypothesis (from association between Phase One and Phase Two to 
association between first and second half of the negotiation).  This hypothesis had a non-
significant correlation, however, visual inspection of the data showed that the data 
trended towards supporting this hypothesis.  This is an important trend as it suggests that 
the abovementioned limitations of insufficient observations of active listening skills and 
the arbitrary phases could be obstructing significant correlations. 
 The third hypothesis proposed an increase in problem solving during the first 
phase would be detrimental to the rest of the negotiation, resulting in increased negative 
perpetrator responding.  This hypothesis attempted to establish the importance of a 
negotiator adapting from a traditional “cop” role of being authoritative and directive, 
which is taught in the National Crisis Negotiator Course (NCNC).  Research conducted 
by Van Hasselt et al. (2005b) and Van Hasselt et al. (2006) demonstrated the emphasis on 
reducing use of problem-solving and directive language and that training was, in fact, 
successful at modifying proficient negotiators use of problem-solving and directive 
“expert” language (Van Hasselt et al., 2005b).  However, the data did not support the 
benefit of this extensive training.  The data did not support the hypothesis, however, 
while it had minor non-significant trend toward support, visual inspection appeared to 
show a random effect.  This result may again be due to limitations in the study, including 
the arbitrary nature of the phases, limited frequency counts, and operational definitions of 
positive and negative perpetrator responses. 
 The final hypothesis proposed a positive impact of specific active listening skills 
that are touted in the literature to be most beneficial in training on communication and 
behavior change: emotional labeling, paraphrasing and summarizing, and open-ended 
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questions (Sommers-Flanagan & Sommers-Flanagan, 2012; Van Hasselt et al., 2006).  
Again, the data trended toward support upon visual inspection, however no significant 
correlations were found.  The strongest association appears to be between open-ended 
questions and positive perpetrator response style.  The same limitations related to 
arbitrary phases and small number of observations of active listening skills are believed 
to have impacted the results. 
 Other limitations of this study include difficulty in operationally defining 
perpetrator response style into positive, negative, and neutral.  Coding concerns included 
remedying the difference between a response that was positive in content but negative in 
valence or vice versa.  Some of this confusion was due to personality factors of 
confederates that presented themselves during the simulated role-plays even with a 
standardized scenario.  Another coding concern was related to negotiators who engaged 
in multiple coded behaviors such as compound questions (e.g., “Is it really bad? And 
even if it is bad, are you sure it’s that big of a deal?”), beginning a question as open-
ended and changing it to closed-ended (e.g., “How did you—did you tell your wife?), and 
going on long tangents (e.g., telling a personal story, multiple pieces of advice given, 
etc.)  These complicated the analyses as it was not always a 1:1 ratio of negotiator 
communication variable to perpetrator response variable coded.  In addition, the 
confederates were encouraged to make the role-plays as organic as possible in an attempt 
to reflect real life.  However, this likely weakened the experimental design of the study 
and introduced too many confounding variables.  Likewise, the physical location of these 
role-plays was not consistently quiet or secluded.  This may have again introduced 
unwanted confounding variables.  Furthermore, observations made by this author during 
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data collection indicate that the informal nature of these simulated negotiations during 
monthly trainings may have led to lax behavior by both the role-player and negotiator.  
For example, it is not uncommon for departments to request the simulated negotiation be 
brief (i.e. 15-20 minutes) as to allow more negotiators to practice being the lead 
negotiator during the training.  Knowing this, it was observed that some confederates 
would prematurely facilitate a non-lethal resolution to allow the negotiation to come to a 
“clean” ending during that time.  While in some cases, the negotiation appeared to come 
to a natural conclusion at around the 20-minute mark (and would therefore reflect 
accurately the effect of active listening skills on the negotiation), other cases that were 
rushed to conclusion may not accurately reflect the impact of active listening skills on 
perpetrator response style during the negotiation. 
Implications for Future Research 
 As stated above, this pilot study intended to contribute to the current research in 
the use of active listening skills within the context of crisis negotiations.  While the study 
had notable limitations, they can be useful in providing recommendations for future 
research endeavors aiming to examine the process of crisis negotiations as opposed to 
focusing solely on the outcome of crisis negotiations.  As such, there are several 
recommendations for future research into the efficacy of active listening skills in crisis 
negotiations.  First and foremost, a significantly larger sample size should be obtained for 
future research.  A larger sample size would allow for more sophisticated statistical 
analyses to be conducted (i.e. GLMM; binomial logistic regressions) that may glean more 
powerful support for the use of active listening skills in crisis negotiations.  It would be 
beneficial for future research to provide more standardization across confederate 
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responding by creating a bank of responses for confederates to use within the 
operationally defined “positive”, “negative”, and “neutral” perpetrator responses.  Future 
research may also wish to assess the value of keeping a “neutral” category as opposed to 
coding perpetrator response as binary codes (i.e. “positive” or “negative”).  Furthermore, 
future research may benefit from conceptualizing the dependent variables (perpetrator 
response style) on a Likert scale (e.g., mildly negative – completely negative; mildly 
positive – completely positive; Beune et al., 2009) to better capture the complexity of 
responses.  Standardization of data collection tools and location may also be beneficial to 
avoid interruptions, dropped calls from loss of signal, and other unintended confounding 
variables.  
Implications for Law Enforcement 
 The preliminary findings of this study offer some support for the teaching of 
active listening skills to law enforcement officers as a verbal de-escalation tactic when 
encountering individuals in crisis.  With the understanding that police departments have 
limited resources and time to dedicate to training, further research should seek to provide 
corroborating empirical support for the use of active listening skills within the context of 
crisis negotiations.  Future research should emphasize not only the relationship between 
active listening skills and non-lethal resolutions, but the relationship between active 
listening skills on demonstrating empathy, building rapport, and influencing behavior 
change with someone in crisis.  The existing literature demonstrates training is effective 
in increasing the use of active listening skills in negotiators (Van Hasselt et al., 2006), 
which is recognized to be an asset in influencing behavior change (Beune et al., 2009; 
Vecchi et al., 2005).  Further research such as this can provide justification for resources 
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and time to be allocated to continued training of law enforcement in active listening 
skills, which may provide officers with an additional practiced tool in their arsenal that 
could reduce risk of bodily harm to themselves and others. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Behavioral Changes Stairway Model (Vecchi, Van Hasselt, & Romano, 
2005) 
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Appendix B: Participant Consent Forms 
 
Consent Form for Participation in the Research Study Entitled 
Effect of Negotiator Active Listening Skills on Crisis (Hostage) Negotiations 
 
Funding Source: None. 
 
IRB Protocol #: 2017-141 
 
Principal Investigator      Co-investigator 
Karen N. Guszkowski, M.S.     Vincent B. Van Hasselt, 
Ph.D. 
8060 NW 10th Court      Nova Southeastern 
University Plantation, FL 33322      College of 
Psychology 
(732) 979-3767 3301 College Avenue  
kg935@nova.edu Fort Lauderdale, Florida 
33314 
(954) 262-5752 
        vanhasse@nova.edu 
 
For questions/concerns about your research rights, contact: 
Human Research Oversight Board (Institutional Review Board or IRB) 
Nova Southeastern University 
(954) 262-5369/Toll Free: 866-499-0790 
IRB@nsu.nova.edu 
 
Site Information 
Nova Southeastern University 
College of Psychology 
3301 College Avenue 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314 
 
What is the study about? 
You are invited to participate in a research study on the use of active listening skills 
within a crisis (hostage) negotiation.  The goal of this study is to explore the effects of 
specific active listening skills (taught at the FBI's National Crisis Negotiation Course) 
within a crisis negotiation by analyzing negotiator use of active listening skills and the 
subsequent perpetrator response style. 
 
Why are you asking me? 
We are inviting you to participate because you have been formally trained on the use of 
active listening skills during crisis (hostage) negotiations and are currently a member of 
your departments team that gets called out to these types of incidents. 
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What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study? 
You will be asked to conduct a simulated crisis negotiation as usual in training where you 
(the police negotiator) and the role player will be in separate areas of the training facility 
and will not be visible to one another. The role player will meet with the officer whose 
role is to collect initial intelligence concerning the scenario and provide certain 
information concerning the scenario.  After receiving this information, you are to initiate 
contact via throw-phone or cell phone, at which time data collection begins. In order for 
the study to generalize to real-world scenarios, we ask that you treat the role play as a 
real-life situation and to rely on your own training and the help of your coaches in the 
negotiation. The role player is to answer the phone call, in character, and begin disclosing 
information as deemed fit given the scenario and the rapport with you.  While typical 
trainings may warrant you to switch out negotiators during the course of the negotiation, 
for the sake of the study, we ask that you remain the sole negotiator.  In addition, while a 
typical training would involve a debriefing following the scenario, in order to maintain 
the fidelity of this study, no debriefing will be conducted until all data is collected.  When 
the negotiation has ended, you will be asked to fill out a brief 6 item demographic 
questionnaire. 
 
Is there any audio or video recording? 
This research project will include audio recording of the negotiation.  The audio 
recording will be available to be heard by the researcher, Karen N. Guszkowski, 
personnel from the IRB, data coders involved with this research project, and the 
dissertation chair/co-investigator Dr. Vincent B. Van Hasselt.  The recording will be 
transcribed by 1-3 coders who will be trained by the PI.  All coders will listen to and code 
the audio recordings in a private environment or through earphones to guard your 
privacy.  The recordings will be kept securely on a password protected external hard-
drive with the PI or a password protected research laptop that is utilized by only the 
researchers and data coders.  The recordings will be kept, per university policy, for 36 
months following the completion of the study on the password protected external hard-
drive by the PI.  The recordings will be permanently deleted at that time from the external 
hard-drive.  Because your voice will be potentially identifiable by anyone who hears the 
recording, your confidentiality for things you say on the recording cannot be guaranteed 
although the researchers will try to limit access to the tape as described in this paragraph. 
 
What are the dangers to me? 
Risks to you are minimal, meaning they are not thought to be greater than other risks you 
experience every day.  Being recorded means that confidentiality cannot be promised.  
Engaging in these scenarios may also produce minimal anxiety or bring back unhappy 
memories.  If this happens, Ms. Guszkowski will try to help you.  If you need further 
help, she will suggest someone you can see but you will have to pay for that yourself.  If 
you have questions about the research, your research rights, or if you experience an injury 
because of the research, please contact Ms. Guszkowski at (732) 979-3767.  You may 
also contact the IRB at the numbers indicated above with questions about your research 
rights. 
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Are there any benefits to me for taking part in this research study? 
There are no benefits to you for participating. 
 
Will I get paid for being in the study?  Will it cost me anything? 
There are no costs to you or payments made for participating in this study. 
 
How will you keep my information private? 
The questionnaire will not ask you for your name and the only reference to your identity 
may come if you choose to introduce yourself by name at the start of the recorded 
negotiation.  For data collection and analysis purposes, you will be de-identified to the 
best of our ability and provided a participant number for reference.  As mentioned, the 
audio recordings will be permanently deleted 36 months after the study ends.  All 
information obtained in this study I strictly confidential unless disclosure is required by 
law.  The IRB, regulatory agencies, or Dr. Van Hasselt may review research records. 
 
What if I do not want to participate or I want to leave the study? 
You have the right to leave this study at any time or refuse to participate.  If you do 
decide to leave or you decide not to participate, you will not experience any penalty or 
loss of training you are expecting to receive.  If you choose to withdraw, any information 
collected about you before the date you leave the study will be kept in the research 
records for 36 months from the conclusion of the study and may be used as a part of the 
research. 
 
Other Considerations: 
If the researchers learn anything which might change your mind about being involved, 
you will be told of this information. 
 
Voluntary Consent by Participant: 
By signing below, you indicate that 
 This study has been explained to you 
 You have read this document or it has been read to you 
 Your questions about this research study have been answered 
 You have been told that you may ask the researchers any study related questions 
in the future or contact them in the event of a research-related injury 
 You have been told that you may ask Institutional Review Board (IRB) personnel 
questions about your study rights 
 You are entitled to a copy of this form after you have read and signed it 
 You voluntarily agree to participate in the study entitled Effect of Negotiator 
Active Listening Skills on Crisis (Hostage) Negotiations 
 
 
 
Participant’s Signature: ____________________________________ 
Date:_________________ 
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Participant’s Name: _______________________________________ 
Date:_________________ 
 
 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent: 
_____________________________________________ 
 
 
Date: __________________ 
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Appendix C: Study Protocol for Role Players (Perpetrators) 
Materials:  1 negotiator 
  1 perpetrator (role-played by Nova Player) 
  1 scenario 
  1 throw-phone (with audio recording capability) 
 
Location: At in-service trainings for local PD’s for CRT 
Time:  no time limit 
Role-Play Procedure:  
1. Negotiator is to provide the throw-phone, in a separate room, to the perpetrator. 
 
2. Perpetrator is to familiarize self with scenario and provide only the information 
listed as Intelligence for Law Enforcement to the officer that comes to collect 
intelligence on the scene. 
 
3. Negotiator is to initiate contact via throw-phone, at which time data collection 
begins. 
a. Negotiator is encouraged to treat the role-play as a real-life situation and is 
to rely on their own training and the help of their coaches in the 
negotiation. 
 
4. Perpetrator is to answer the phone call, in character, and begin disclosing 
information as they deem fit given their scenario and their rapport with the 
negotiator. 
a. Perpetrator is encouraged to treat the role-play as a real-life situation and 
is to try and remain in character, letting the negotiation happen as 
organically as possible.  
i. They are encouraged to question, laugh with, curse at, hang-up on, 
or threaten the negotiator when appropriate in the role-play. 
ii. They may use the Key Phrases outlined in the scenario to help 
them get into character. 
b. They are to use the scenario as the guideline for their role-play and to not 
disclose their Hook until they feel it natural that negotiator has built 
enough rapport to warrant that information. 
i. Perpetrator is encouraged to provide a strong negative response to 
Triggers outlined in the scenario. 
c. Perpetrator is to end the negotiation either as a lethal or non-lethal (come-
out) resolution depending on the natural progression of the negotiation. 
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Appendix D: Coding Key 
Active Listening Skill Variables 
 
(P) Paraphrasing and summarizing.  These types of active listening are rephrasing of 
content stated by the perpetrator.  Paraphrasing would be rephrasing a single sentence or 
topic while a summary is rephrasing several topics covered.   
I.E. “so it sounds like a lot is going on with your mother recently passing away, your 
girlfriend leaving you, and your boss getting on your case at your job.” 
 
(M) Mirroring.  This type of active listening skill is also known as a non-directive 
reflection and is simply a restatement of the perpetrator’s own words.   
I.E. perpetrator states “I’m just so sick and tired” and the negotiator responds “sick and 
tired.” 
 
(E) Emotional labeling.  This type of active listening skill is also known as interpretive 
reflection of feeling and is a statement made by the negotiator that indicates what feeling 
or feelings the negotiator believes are underlying the perpetrator’s thoughts or actions.   
I.E. “you seem distraught!” 
 
(Y) “I” messages.  This type of active listening skill can either be a non-threatening way 
to communicate how the perpetrator is making the negotiator feel or a way to refocus the 
perpetrator when they are verbally attacking the negotiator.   
I.E. “I’m worried that you feel I’m only here to do a job.” 
 
(O) Open-ended questions.  This type of active listening skill is a query that requires 
more than a single-word response and directly elicits information from the perpetrator.   
I.E. “Tell me more about that…” 
 
(U) Minimal encouragers.  This type of active listening skill is a sound made by the 
negotiator to let the perpetrator know the negotiator is still there and listening while not 
interfering with the flow of conversation.   
I.E. “uh-huh.”, “sure”, “wow” 
 
Negotiator Tactic Variables 
 
(J) Face-saving justification/Minimization. These variables are considered precursors to 
the ending of a crisis that consist of rationalizations, justification, and mitigations of a 
perpetrators actions.  
I.E. “you didn’t kill anybody yet, you haven’t done anything wrong!” 
 
(N) Normalizing. This type of active listening skill is also known as feeling validation 
and is a statement made by the negotiator that supports, affirms, approves of, or validates 
feelings articulated by the perpetrator.   
I.E. “it seems completely normal that you feel that way!” 
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(C) Closed-ended questions.  This type of active listening skill is a query that can be 
answered with a single-word response and directly elicits information from the 
perpetrator.  
I.E. “Do you want to talk to me?” 
 
(V) Problem-solving.  This type of active listening skill is also known as advice and is a 
recommendation given to the perpetrator by the negotiator.  It can include 
recommendations on how to act, think, or feel.   
I.E. “Why don’t we try putting the gun down.” 
 
Perpetrator Response Style Variables 
 
(2) Positive response. A word, statement, or other audible cue from the perpetrator that 
indicates the negotiator has aligned with, built rapport with, or otherwise pro-socially 
influenced the perpetrator.   
I.E. “You’re right.” 
 
(1) Negative response. A word, statement, or other audible cue from the perpetrator that 
indicates the negotiator has not aligned with, built rapport with, or otherwise pro-socially 
influenced the perpetrator.   
I.E. “Screw you; I’m going to kill everyone in here.” 
 
(0) Neutral response. A response by the perpetrator that does not meet the definition for 
either positive or negative response.   
I.E. “I guess, but…”. 
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Appendix E: Standardized Scenario 
Scenario: 
Michael/Michaela (40 years old, no children) was a successful banker who has been 
living an “upper-class” lifestyle.  Unfortunately, several of his/her personal investment 
decisions have failed and he/she is facing financial ruin.  He/She believes this will bring 
shame to his/her family, his/her husband/wife will leave him/her, and his/her possessions 
will be taken away.  He/She feels hopeless and helpless.  He/She believes that suicide is 
the only way out.  A co-worker at the bank observes him/her with a gun in his/her office 
and called the police to intervene. 
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Appendix F: Intelligence Provided for Law Enforcement 
Intelligence for Law Enforcement: intelligence to be provided to law enforcement 
(negotiator) prior to simulated negotiation beginning. 
“I need the police to get here ASAP! I was passing by Michael/Micaela’s office 
and saw him in tears with gun on his/her desk!  Please come quickly!  I’ve never 
seen him/her like this before, I don’t know if he is planning to hurt himself or us!  
I’m trying to get everyone out of the building as quickly and quietly as I can but 
please please hurry!” 
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Appendix G: Key Phrases for Role Players (Perpetrators) 
Key Phrases: to help role player (perpetrator) get into character and to potentially be 
used during negotiation. 
  “I’m ruined; my life is over.” 
 “My family will be so ashamed of me.” 
 “This is hopeless, I can’t go on.” 
 “Killing myself is the only answer.” 
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Appendix H: Hook for Role Players (Perpetrators) 
Hook: pertinent information to the reason for the crisis negotiation that is not to be 
disclosed unless role player (perpetrator) feels rapport is established. 
“I’ve worked hard to provide a good life for my wife/husband and I…in an instant 
it’s all gone.  The market turned so quickly and I lost everything.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
Appendix I: Triggers for Role Players (Perpetrators) 
Triggers: subjects of conversation that will cause the role player (perpetrator) to escalate 
emotionally. 
Talking about material things and activities he/she enjoyed doing with his/her 
wife/husband.  
–and- 
Discussing stereotypical roles of a male, e.g. “I’m supposed to be the 
breadwinner!” (if male role-player)  
–or-  
Discussing stereotypical roles of females, e.g. “Now I’m just like every other 
woman needing to be supported by her man!” (if female role-player) 
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Appendix J: 6-item post-negotiation questionnaire for negotiator 
 
 
(1) Name: ____________________________________________________ 
 
(2) Department: ________________________________________________ 
 
(3) Age: ______________________________________________________ 
 
(4) Gender: Male [    ]  or Female [    ] 
 
(5) Years as a Law Enforcement Officer (LEO): _______________________ 
 
(6) Years on CRT/HRT/etc: _______________________________________ 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
i Calculated by taking the summation of the frequencies for each active listening skill used in phase one and 
dividing it by the total frequency of negotiator communication variables in phase one.  
ii Calculated by taking the summation of the frequencies of negative perpetrator response in phase two and 
dividing it by the total frequency of perpetrator responses in phase two. 
iii Calculated by taking the summation of frequencies for each active listening skill used in phases one and 
two and dividing it by the total frequency of negotiator communication variables in phases one and two 
iv Calculated by taking the summation of frequencies for positive perpetrator responses in phases three and 
four and dividing it by the total frequency of perpetrator responses in phases three and four. 
v Calculated by taking the frequency for problem-solving in phase one and dividing it by the total frequency 
of negotiator communication variables in phase one. 
vi Calculated by taking the summation of frequencies for negative perpetrator responses in phases two, 
three, and four and dividing it by the total frequency of perpetrator responses in phases two, three, and four. 
vii Calculated by taking the summation of frequencies for emotional labeling, paraphrasing/summarizing, 
and open-ended questions in phases one and two and dividing it by the total frequency of negotiator 
communication variables in phases one and two. 
viii Calculated by taking the summation of frequencies for emotional labeling, paraphrasing/summarizing, 
and open-ended questions in phases one and two and dividing it by the total frequency of perpetrator 
responses in phases three and four. 
ix Calculated by taking the frequency of emotional labeling in phases one and two and dividing it by the 
total frequency of negotiator communication variables in phases one and two. 
x Calculated by taking the frequency of paraphrasing/summarizing in phases one and two and dividing it by 
the total frequency of negotiator communication variables in phases one and two. 
xi Calculated by taking the frequency of open-ended questions in phases one and two and dividing it by the 
total frequency of negotiator communication variables in phases one and two. 
xii Calculated as an exact agreement percentage within a 10-second interval 
